Hannah Arendt and Human Rights by Cartland, Jenifer D. C.
Loyola University Chicago 
Loyola eCommons 
Master's Theses Theses and Dissertations 
1992 
Hannah Arendt and Human Rights 
Jenifer D. C. Cartland 
Loyola University Chicago 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses 
 Part of the Political Science Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Cartland, Jenifer D. C., "Hannah Arendt and Human Rights" (1992). Master's Theses. 3912. 
https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses/3912 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more 
information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu. 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License. 
Copyright © 1992 Jenifer D. C. Cartland 
LOYOLA UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO 
HANNAH ARENDT AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
A THESIS SUBMITTED TO 
THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL 
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF 
MASTER OF ARTS 
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
BY 
JENIFER D. C. CARTLAND 
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 
MAY, 1992 
Copyright by Jenifer D.C. Cartland, 1991 
All Rights Reserved 
ii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
It is with much gratitude that I acknowledge the guidance 
and patience provided by my thesis committee members, Profs. 
Claudio J. Katz and Robert C. Mayer. Their ideas and 
suggestions were always helpful; their approach always 
supportive. 
Furthermore, I would like to thank my husband, Jeff Sader, 
for the confidence that he places in me, the expression of which 
is always well-timed. 
i:i.i 
In memory of my grandfather, 
Raymond Eliot: 
my own, personal coach 
1905-1980 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 
1. THE "STEPCHILD" OF POLITICAL THOUGHT 
The Rise of Statelessness 
2. 
Philosophical Weaknesses of Human Rights 
Practical Weaknesses of Human Rights 
The World and Human Diversity 
A NEW FOUNDATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 
The Dominance of the Life Process and World 
Alienation 
The Effect of Worldlessness on the Human Status 
Three Categories of Rights 
3. INSTITUTIONALIZING HUMAN RIGHTS 
The Appearance of Crimes Against Humanity 
International Legal Deterrents 
The Personification of the State 
International Political Deterrents 
Intranational Political Deterrents 
4. CONCLUSION 
An Arendtian Theory of Human Rights? 
The Efficacy of Arendt's Theory 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
VITA 
iv 
iii 
1 
10 
37 
59 
85 
101 
103 
INTRODUCTION 
According to Hannah Arendt, the liberal conception of human 
rights is troublesome. Specifically, the idea of human rights 
that was posited in the United Nations' Declaration of Human 
Rights was inadequate when it came to preventing the continuing 
spread of statelessness -- one of the events that spurred its 
creation. In a 1949 article, Arendt sharply criticized this 
conception and any other conceptions of human rights that are 
rooted in the natural right tradition. 
Underlying her criticisms of such rights is a tension in 
her thought between the practical need that she sees for 
universal human rights and her dissatisfaction with the 
philosophical construction of universal rights. For Arendt, 
rights are born of political activity within the political 
community. Any rights, then, that claim to be "universal", that 
are pressed upon the political community from the outside, can 
be justifiably considered irrelevant by the political community. 
Thus, she asks, can there be such a thing as a right that 
belongs to individuals solely because they are biologically 
human (a universal right) and, at the same time, leave 
individuals free to discover their own political character (a 
contingent right)? The tension is most clearly displayed by 
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juxtaposing Eichmann in Jerusalem, in which Arendt attempts to 
defend the concept of crimes against humanity, and the end of 
the second section of The Origins of Totalitarianism (based on 
her 1949 article), in which she defends a Burkean conception of 
human rights. This thesis questions whether the tension 
apparent in Arendt's work is truly an inconsistency in Arendt's 
thinking or if it can be resolved within the framework of her 
broader, more comprehensive, work. In other words, does Hannah 
Arendt defend a notion of human rights? If so, what is that 
notion and how is it defended? 
Arendt refers to traditional notions of human rights when 
she labels human rights as the "step-child" of nineteenth 
century political thought. Unlike nineteenth century rights 
theorists, she argues, twentieth century rights theorists need 
no longer rely on mere conceptions of the abstract human being: 
we have empirically observed it. For Arendt, one of the most 
important developments of this century was the appearance of 
superfluousness, first showing itself in the form of 
statelessness. Where eighteenth and nineteenth century 
philosophers conceived of the abstract human being as alone 
among other lone human beings in the state of nature, Arendt 
claims instead that the true abstract human being is, like the 
stateless, locked out of the human world altogether. If to 
retain one's humanity is to belong to the humanly fabricated 
world and to have one's actions and speech made relevant by the 
context of that world, then to be stateless is to be in the 
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position of having one's actions and speech lose their meaning 
and, thus, to lose one's humanity. This is precisely the 
position into which Arendt believes stateless peoples and· 
persons were placed. 
Arendt argues that the rise of statelessness demonstrates 
the impotence of earlier human rights doctrines. These 
conceptions of human rights were not defensible philosophically 
and had never been practically implemented. Thus, there were 
neither philosophical constructs nor practical precedents to 
prevent the emergence of statelessness. In fact, such human 
rights were not even claimed by those who were stateless. 
Rather, the stateless relied on their past claims to national 
rights, harkening back to a time where their rights had 
political significance and reviving their cultures, languages 
and, through them, their political history. 
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Based on the evidence presented by this century, Arendt 
believes that a new conception of human rights is warranted and, 
in fact, required. The new conception can not be found by 
reexamining natural rights, however, which has been the response 
of most other thinkers. Rather, a politically compelling notion 
of human rights can be found only by questioning what types of 
laws implemented by what types of institutions would have been 
capable of preventing statelessness. Thus, by locating a 
deterrent for statelessness, Arendt hopes to find a new notion 
of human rights that holds clout. 
But beyond the narrow goal of uncovering her views on human 
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rights theory as it stood suring the 1940s, the thesis questions 
whether Hannah Arendt's analysis of human rights has anything to 
contribute to current debates concerning human rights. Although 
this is not the primary goal of the thesis, it is worthwhile 
posing this question in order to place her thinking in the 
context of human rights discourse in general. This second 
question also brings us closer to Arendt's criticism of 
traditional ideas of human rights. 
Since Arendt wrote the 1949 article, a large number of 
studies have been written on the notion of human rights. Most 
of this work has not challenged the natural right foundation of 
human rights. It has, instead, focused on the relation between 
right and duty, on the one hand, and on the content of human 
rights, on the other. Even within the boundaries to which the 
literature limits itself, Arendt's basic criticisms of human 
rights have not been responded to. The following briefly 
outlines these basic criticisms in reference to the more recent 
literature on human rights. 
Arendt has several specific criticisms of human rights 
which fall into three broad categories. First, since rights are 
only necessary in the political community, the idea of natural 
rights is inherently flawed. Of late, scholars have generally 
and indirectly agreed with Arendt on this point and prefer the 
term "moral right" to natural rights. This, they argue, 
reflects the social roots of rights -- human or otherwise 
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and, at the same time, emphasizes their universal nature. 1 As 
Martin and Nickel admit, "the word 'moral' seems to be doing 
much of the same work in this context as the word 'natural' used 
to do." 2 The important advantage of the term moral rights is 
that moral norms, upon which rights are based, can be 
conventional -- natural rights can not be. 
Problems arise only when moral rights are intended to be 
applied world-wide, especially when relevant world-wide moral 
norms do not exist. However, as Martin and Nickel point out, it 
is not important that the moral norms are actually cross-
culturally agreed upon. Rather, the moral norms can be 
"critical," meaning that they represent what the moral norms in 
each culture ought to be. 3 It is altogether unclear how such 
rights are not, for all practical purposes, as politically 
irrelevant to political communities which do not discover them 
themselves as are natural rights. In other words, Arendt might 
have responded, to the society that creates them, moral rights 
are conventional; but to the society that they are pressed upon, 
they are natural. Whatever human rights end up being, says 
Arendt, they must be both politically compelling and universal 
-- they must have the capacity to force just laws into being 
while not robbing the political community of the opportunity to 
1. Joel Feinberg, Social Philosophy (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Foundations of Philosophy Series, 1973), 84-85. 
2. Rex Martin and James W. Nickel, "Recent Work on the Concept 
of Rights," American Philosophical Quarterly 17 (Jul 1980): 165. 
3. Martin and Nickel, 175. 
discover them themselves. 
Arendt's second class of criticisms has to do with to whom 
the rights belong and towards whom or what the rights are· 
addressed. Arendt asks: What is protected by human rights and 
who or what is responsible for providing that protection? To 
the first half of the question it is evident that the U.N. 
Declaration contends that the individual is protected. 
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Virtually all human rights theorists agree. 4 The responses to 
the second half of the question are less unanimous. Some, like 
Cranston and Raphael, hold that human rights are claimed against 
other individuals; others, like Feinberg, hold that they are 
claimed against the government; still others respond that the 
answer depends on the situation. 
To Arendt, the responses of natural rights theorists to 
both halves of the question are wrong. She does not think that 
merely the well-being of many, many individuals is protected by 
human rights. Rather, the whole of civilization is protected. 
Thus, Arendt's plea for an examination of human rights is 
infused with an urgency more profound than the pleas of natural 
rights theorists. Further, the agent that has the capacity to 
promote human rights is not the individual or the state -- but 
both in every situation. Human rights can only be protected 
when they are publicly and consciously grafted into state and 
4. See, for example: Cranston, M., "Human Rights, Real and 
Supposed," and D.D. Raphael, "Human Rights, Old and New," chaps. 
in ed. D.D. Raphael, Political Theory and the Rights of Man 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1967); and Miller, 
D., Social Justice (Glasgow: Oxford, 1976). 
international institutions. Human rights are not protected 
through personal "duty'', but through the efforts of individuals 
and communities to assure the survival of civilization. 
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Arendt's final class of criticisms of traditionally-
contrived notions of human rights has to do with how they are 
defended. Although most human rights theorists can identify a 
real live human rights violation "when they see it," their ideas 
concerning human rights are only partially based on empirical 
evidence. Where they all beery the Nazi concentration camps, 
only Arendt dissects the actual political events that led to 
their creation. It is upon this wholly empirical foundation 
that Arendt builds her ideas concerning human rights. Thus, as 
we will see in the first chapter of this thesis, Arendt holds 
that no notion of "natural" human rights can be defended because 
such notions are based upon a picture of the abstract human 
being that has never appeared on earth in such a way that it 
could actually be observed and examined. Furthermore, Arendt 
asks, if natural conceptions of human rights are correct, why 
are the human rights of persons and peoples continuously 
violated -- even in countries whose constitutions are based upon 
them -- and, most important, how could statelessness continue to 
occur? Certainly, Arendt believes, natural rights notions of 
human rights have held no political clout when they have been 
most necessary. This in itself points to the flaws that result 
from their non-empirical foundation. 
Arendt contends that instead of being based on human 
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experience, traditionally-contrived notions of human rights "had 
never been philosophically established but merely formulated, 
[and] had never been politically secured but merely 
proclaimed. " 5 It is difficult, based on the foregoing 
discussion, to postulate that her opinion would have changed 
today. 
This thesis attempts to draw out Arendt's specific concerns 
with conceptions of human rights that are based on the natural 
right tradition. The first chapter will discuss more fully 
Arendt's criticisms of human rights and will show how human 
rights were powerless to prevent the rise of statelessness and 
of correcting its effects. Arendt's critique has two 
dimensions: human rights were not substantive enough either 
philosophically or practically to deal with statelessness. 
Thus, included in the discussion are Arendt's philosophical as 
well as practical critique of human rights. 
The second chapter focuses on what form Arendt believes a 
legitimate concept of human rights should take. Her diagnosis 
of how statelessness became possible is outlined by reviewing 
her thoughts regarding world alienation. If world alienation is 
associated with the rise of statelessness then any meaningful 
concept of human rights must have the capacity to reverse it. 
Therefore, the chapter ends by describing her three categories 
of rights, fitting them into their appropriate roles in relation 
5. Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 3 ed. (New 
York: Harcourt, Brace, and Jovanovich, 1973), 447. 
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to solving the problems presented by world alienation. 
Since one of Arendt's most convincing criticisms of 
traditional concepts of human rights is that they can not be put 
into practice, it is imperative for Arendt to show that her 
notion of human rights, in fact, can be put into practice. The 
third chapter will examine her struggle with this issue by 
looking, first, at her analysis of the Adolf Eichmann trial and, 
second, at her critique of the nation-state system. Based upon 
the issues raised, the chapter will conclude by discussing what 
types of international and intranational structures are required 
to assure that human rights are protected. 
The last chapter will attempt to do two things. First, 
Arendt's thoughts on human rights will be summarized; the 
discussion will try to determine if her various thoughts 
comprise an actual theory of human rights in its own right or 
whether they are backdrops or appendages to other, more central 
components of her work. The second objective of the last 
chapter will be to ask if Arendt's views of human rights, 
regardless of what she intended, can inform current debates. 
What, if anything, can human rights theorists who frame their 
arguments within the natural right tradition learn from Arendt? 
It is hoped that this exercise will lead to a fuller 
understanding of the efficacy of human rights as an 
international standard of political conduct today. 
CHAPTER 1 
THE "STEPCHILD" OF POLITICAL THOUGHT 
To Hannah Arendt, traditionally conceived concepts of human 
rights (e.g., human rights derived from the natural right 
tradition) were ill-defined. She quipped that the constitutions 
of human right organizations "showed an uncanny similarity in 
language and composition to that of societies for the prevention 
of cruelty to animals." 1 According to Arendt, there was 
something inherently nonsensical and out-of-place about 
traditional concepts of human rights when they were applied to 
the events of this century. Arendt claims that, following World 
War I, "the very phrase 'human rights' became for all concerned 
-- victims, prosecutors, and onlookers alike -- the evidence of 
hopeless idealism or fumbling feeble-minded hypocrisy." 2 She 
suggests that natural right theorists could not and did not 
devise a construct of human rights that dealt adequately with 
twentieth century political problems. 
However, Arendt held that a notion of human rights, 
properly conceived, is necessary. She appears to appeal to this 
other concept of human rights as she tries to disentangle the 
1. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 292. 
2. Ibid., 2 91. 
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meaning of the phrase "crimes against humanity" in her report on 
the Eichmann trial. Arendt sought to retrieve human rights from 
the position that they had fallen into -- one of political 
irrelevance -- by reconstructing them based on the experiences 
of the twentieth century. This experience could not have been 
anticipated by eighteenth and nineteenth century philosophers 
whose thought stood at the foundation for traditional concepts 
of human rights. 
For Arendt, one of the unprecedented and most significant 
developments of the twentieth century was the appearance of 
statelessness -- persons who not only were deprived of their 
political home but who also had no hope of finding a new one had 
never existed before. Where certain rights were once thought to 
be inalienable, the status and conditions of the stateless 
indicated that no rights were so sacred or indigenous to the 
human animal as to be "given at birth". The plight of stateless 
individuals and comr:lunities warranted a new look at human 
rights, the rights upon which all other rights were supposed to 
have been based: if they exist, what they are, where they come 
from and what obligations they place on the body politic. 
Arendt begins by examining the events preceding World War 
II closely and concludes that certain political developments of 
the twentieth century paved the way for the rise of 
statelessness. Two forces in particular shaped the complexion 
of statelessness: 1) the reorganization of Europe that followed 
World War I which itself was rooted to a significant degree in 
the race-thinking of the nineteenth century, and 2) the 
inability of the natural right tradition to prevent the 
reorganization of Europe from turning against itself. 
The Rise of Statelessness 
Before discussing how statelessness arose, it is first 
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necessary to discuss what Arendt claims that stateless is and 
how it differs from other, earlier forms of exile. There are two 
differences between the traditional refugee and the new refugee: 
what turned a person into a refugee and the relationship between 
the refugee and protective law. Traditionally, a person became 
a refugee when his or her actions or beliefs were such that he 
or she required international asylum. 3 Never completely 
breaking the ties with his or her homeland, the refugee found 
civil protection in a new country which protected his or her 
right to think and to act freely. The new country expected that 
the refugee either a) truly belonged to his or her original 
political community orb) would become a member of the new 
political community. Forced migration to another political 
entity is not new. 4 What is new is not the crime but the 
innocence of the refugee and "not the loss of a home but the 
impossibility of finding a new one." 5 
3. Ibid. , 2 8 0. 
4. Arendt, "'The Rights of Man' What Are They?" The Modern 
Review 3 (1949): 26. 
5 . Ibid. , 2 6 . 
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According to Arendt, it is the essence of the act of 
deeming persons as stateless that the refugees' acts are 
irrelevant to the decision to make them stateless. The European 
stateless became refugees not because of who they were (i.e.: 
what they believed or what they did) but because of what they 
were (i.e.: Armenians, Jews, etc.) . 6 Thus, they gained refugee 
status because of what might be termed the conscious blindness 
of nation-states to their actions and speech. 
Unlike traditional refugees, the stateless are abstracted 
from political society -- from the world through which their 
unique selves can be revealed. By being in this condition, 
their speech and their actions have no relevance. They may be 
free to speak and to move about; but neither their speech nor 
their movement has any consequence to anyone but themselves: 
. their freedom of movement, if they have it at all, 
gives them no right to residence which even the jailed 
criminal enjoys as a matter of course; and their freedom of 
opinion is a fool's freedom, for nothing they think matters 
anyhow . 
. The fundamental deprivation of human rights takes 
place first and above all in depriving a person of a place 
in the world which makes his opinions significant and his 
actions effective. 7 
This point is exemplified by the treatment of the Jews who were 
expelled from Germany not because they were enemies of the 
German state but because of what they categorically and 
irreversibly were: Jews. Jews were treated as enemies "without 
first having given them the chance to have opinions and choose 
6. Ibid., 27. 
7. Ibid., 29. 
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sides." 8 In other words, Jews were criminalized without giving 
them the chance to become criminals. The unilateral expectation 
that any action or speech generated by the Jews would and could 
have no significant influence on their fate deprived them of 
their place in the human world. Thus, "Jews never were 
recognized as full-fledged enemies of Nazism because their 
opposition did not rest upon conviction or action. They 
[ instead] had been deprived of the faculty for both. " 9 In this 
way, the loss of the world corresponds to the loss of one's 
human appearance, for to lose the world which makes our actions 
and speech meaningful is "to transform men into something they 
are not . " 10 
It is worth pausing here to note that the insignificance of 
the thoughts and actions of the stateless individual became 
poignantly real to Arendt when she was imprisoned in 1939. 
Especially telling is her account of why she did not, although 
she serioulsy considered doing so, take her own life while held 
in an internment camp. She reports that whenever she asked 
herself whether she should commit suicide, the answer that came 
to her was "somewhat of a joke." Later, she articulated the 
"joke" : 
The general opinion [among the internees] held that one had 
to be abnormally asocial and unconcerned about general 
events if one was still able to interpret the whole 
8 . Ibid. , 2 9 . 
9. Ibid. , 2 9 . 
10. Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1958), 183. 
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accident [of being imprisoned] as personal and individual 
bad luck and, accordingly, ended one's life personally and 
individually. But the same people, as soon as they 
returned to their individuals lives, being faced with 
seemingly individual problems, changed once more to the 
insane optimism [manifest in a violent courage for life] 
which is next door to depair. 11 
Suicide, which presupposed that the internment was personally 
deserved, and the "violent courage for life," which presupposed 
that one's acts could make a difference, both required a social 
context in order to be made significant or real. However, the 
internees had been abstracted from the world, from all social 
context. Despair was the only remaining option for the sane 
person. In this way, the stateless drifted in unreality. The 
joke was that Arendt did not have the power to return the 
rejection that the world handed to her even through such an 
extreme act as suicide. Worldless, powerless, she could find no 
vindication. 
"Conscious blindness" had its political roots in the 
Minority Treaties that were negotiated at the close of the First 
World War. Designed to assure the stability of the European 
nation-state system, the treaties gave national sovereignty to 
the ethnic majority and established "official" relationships 
between the ethnic majority and the larger ethnic minorities in 
each nation-state. The Minority Treaties provided explicit 
protection to large minorities; however, they provided no 
protection to smaller minorities. Small minorities possessed 
11. As quoted in Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, Hannah Arendt: For 
Love of the World (New Haven: Yale Univerity Press, 1982), 154. 
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only the indirect protection of the League of Nations. 
Since only nation-states were represented in the League of 
Nations, Arendt contends that the newly formed international 
body held little hope of resolving inter-ethnic problems. The 
mere formulation of the Minority Treaties itself implied a 
certain intolerance of minorities not protected by national law: 
these other minorities must "be either assimilated or 
liquidated. " 12 In addition, to the extent that they presumed 
that this level of intolerance was acceptable, the Minority 
Treaties and the League of Nations ignored the inter-state 
nature of the minorities. 13 
The Congress of Organized National Groups in European 
States was formed by the minority groups that were not protected 
by the Minority Treaties as a means of articulating common 
concerns of minorities to the League of Nations. However, the 
Congress became a forum for pursuing ethnic, not common, 
interests and was held together by the tenuous and fated 
cooperation of the Germans and the Jews -- the two largest 
minority groups in Europe. 14 
The desire for political stability permitted conscious 
blindness to become institutionalized in the form of the League 
of Nations and the Minority Treaties. The League was "neither 
willing nor able to overthrow the laws by which nation-states 
12. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 273. 
13. Ibid., 273, 278. 
14. Ibid., 274. 
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, t d 1115 exis e . Having no reliable avenue for representation, 
untreatied minority groups became politically irrelevant to the 
stability of the European nation-state system. Untreatied· 
minorities no longer needed to be negotiated with, they only 
needed to be stabilized. 
The risk of expulsion was great for such peoples. The 
nation-states which participated in mass denationalizations 
"presupposed a state structure which, if it was not yet fully 
totalitarian, at least would not tolerate any opposition and 
would rather lose its citizens than harbor people with different 
views. " 16 Although extreme intolerance was shown by only a 
subset of European nation-states, 
. there was hardly a country left on the Continent that 
did not pass between the two wars some new legislation 
which. . was always phrased to allow for getting rid of 
a great number of its inhabitants at any opportune moment. 17 
The first of these laws, significantly, came from France. 18 
But it was not only the untreatied minorities who had 
reason to fear being expelled. The treatment of treatied 
minorities as well, such as the Jews and Armenians, proved that 
Minority Treaties could be used to "single out certain groups 
for eventual expulsion. " 19 
15. Ibid., 273. 
16. Ibid., 278. 
17. Ibid., 278-279. 
18. Ibid., 279. 
19. Ibid., 282. 
18 
Once expelled from one political entity, the impossibility 
of finding a new home was exacerbated by the sheer numbers of 
the stateless. The right to asylum was always conceived a~ a 
right for the exceptional few. Even if the stateless were 
exiled for political activities on their part, other countries 
could not have handled the volume of those who would have 
requested asylum. 
Civilized countries had offered the right to asylum to 
refugees who, for political reasons, had been persecuted by 
their governments . . The trouble arose when it appeared 
that the new categories of persecuted were far too numerous 
to be handled by an unofficial practice designed for 
exceptional cases. 20 
And where at one time peoples could relocate to a new continent 
(i.e.: the Puritans in North America), such an option was no 
longer available. 
The calamity [of the stateless] did not arise out of lack 
of civilization, backwardness or mere tyranny, but, on the 
contrary, could not be repaired because there was no longer 
any "uncivilized" spot on earth, because, whether we like 
it or not, we have really started to live in One World. 
Only in a completely organized humanity could a loss of 
home and political status become identical with being 
expelled from humanity altogether. 21 
In the past, not even a tyrant could deprive the individual of 
human status: 22 if all other options failed, the individual could 
take his or her family or community elsewhere and begin a new 
political world. Today, no such luxury exists. "It [is] not a 
20. Arendt, "'The Rights of Man' What Are They?", 27. 
21. Ibid., 30. 
22. Ibid., 30. 
19 
problem of space but of political organization." 23 The 
imperialistic exploits of the nineteenth century redefined the 
frontiers in the uncivilized world, which had formerly been 
perceived as places of political refuge, to be the periphery of 
civilization where refuge from civilization is no longer 
possible. 
Non-sovereign nationalities had no options by which to 
escape the predicament presented by the reorganized European 
nation-state system. They could neither petition for adequate 
representation nor create a new political entity in a foreign 
geographic location. In this respect, the minorities either 
were on the verge of becoming or had already become worldless; 
they were purged from the concrete human organization that gave 
their speech and actions meaning. According to Arendt, these 
refugees, the stateless, were the first historical manifestation 
of the nineteenth century enigma "the abstract human being," 
persons without a world. 
Philosophical Weaknesses of Human Rights 
The political developments of the twentieth century only 
tell half of the story of how the stateless actually came into 
being. According to Arendt, there was no adequate philosophical 
or practical counter-force to the creation of statelessness 
after the First World War. On the one hand, this convinces her 
that statelessness really was unprecedented. On the other hand, 
23. Ibid., 26. 
20 
and more important, this convinces her of the philosophical and 
practical impotence of the Rights of Man doctrine. 
Arendt uses the terms the "Rights of Man" and "natural 
rights" interchangeably. Her language indicates that she groups 
together any ideas of rights that are founded on the natural 
right tradition: she contends that any laws justified by appeals 
to nature are nullified by politics. Rights, then, that are 
based on natural right can not demand any obligations from 
society. 24 It might be fair to say that, to Arendt, the term 
"natural rights" is an oxymoron: rights, by the fact that they 
carry an obligation to the political community, can only be 
rooted in the communal experience. An individual in the state 
of nature has no need for rights since he or she is, by 
definition, solely self-concerned. Alone, individuals are not 
involved in a social grouping through which rights would become 
necessary. Thus, natural rights can not exist. 
In addition to the terms "Rights of Man" and "natural 
rights", she uses the terms "human rights" and "national rights" 
(or "citizen rights"). Similar to natural rights, human rights 
designates the essence of rights that are derived from the 
individuals's biological humanness. They can not be conveyed 
directly in positive law, however, where law becomes "an 
instrument of the nation. " 25 National rights -- the rights of 
the citizen -- are the practical, positivistic formulations of 
24. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 297-298. 
25. Ibid., 230. 
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human rights. 
Human rights differ from natural rights in that human 
rights never were philosophically explored and defended during 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 26 Because of this, 
Arendt refers to human rights as the "stepchild" of nineteenth 
century political thought. 27 Instead of being the central tenet 
of revolutionary thought, they were instead only claimed by 
those who had no other rights through which to participate in 
the political community. 28 
Conceptions of human rights based on natural right offered 
no philosophical counter-force to the rise of statelessness. 
All conceptions of rights -- human, natural or national -- based 
upon natural right are fundamentally limited in three ways. 
First, natural right itself is apolitical, according to Arendt. 
Natural right exists and is active where individuals are 
abstracted from community; rights, however, exist and are 
relevant only in a human community. 29 Thus, natural rights have 
only limited bearing, if any, on our political world. If 
politics exists only where individuals co-exist, then law which 
applied to individuals where they do not co-exist can not be 
used to guide the activities of politics. 
26. Arendt, "'The Rights of Man' What Are They?", 24. 
27. Ibid., 24. 
28. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 293. 
29. Arendt, "'The Rights of Man' What Are They?", 34. 
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For example, Arendt claims that the notion of equality has 
no relation to natural law, but rather is related to the 
political world. If, in nature, human beings are unequal, in 
society, they need not be. "Equality is not given us but is the 
result of human organization insofar as it is guided by the 
principle of justice," 30 which is discoverable only through the 
experience of community. Laws concerning equality are out of 
place in the natural world where individuals are essentially 
private and self-concerned. In the same way, natural laws are 
out of place in political, public society. 
Second, natural rights theorists could not have imagined 
the true relationship between the individual and the state. 
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, natural rights 
theorists could only invent an idea of the human being 
abstracted from society -- they could make no empirical 
observations: 
. the paradox involved in the declaration of 
inalienable human rights was that it reckoned with an 
"abstract" human being who seemed to exist nowhere, for 
even savages lived in some kind of social order. 31 
Tyranny, the cause of their concerns, no matter how ruthless, 
never could strip an individual of inalienable rights and 
thereby strip him or her of his or her humanity. 32 This 
conception, however, presupposed that human beings could simply 
30. Ibid., 33. 
31. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 291. 
32. Arendt, "'The Rights of Man' What Are They?", 30. 
transport their political world elsewhere when negotiations 
failed. The only important human right that was derived from 
natural rights -- the right of asylum -- was thus defended. 
Individuals had bargaining power. But, Arendt claims, such 
individuals are not abstract human beings at all. Abstract 
human beings, instead, are simply ignored, not bargained with. 
And the first glaring fact was that [the stateless]. 
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were no longer . . a liability and an image of shame for 
prosecutors . . Innocence, in the sense of complete lack 
of responsibility was the mark of their rightlessness as it 
was the seal of their loss of political status. 33 
Abstract human beings have no political bargaining power 
whatsoever. Natural rights theorists could have imagined 
neither what abstract human beings looked like (because they did 
not exist at the time) nor which rights would be necessary in 
order for them to maintain or retrieve their concreteness. 
In the twentieth century, however, human beings abstracted 
from society have been empirically observed. "Mankind. 
which was only a concept or an ideal for eighteenth century man, 
has grown into a hard, inescapable reality." 34 What Arendt sees 
as the relationship between the individual and the state varies 
radically from natural rights theorists. The abstract human 
being remains an atom, but is not alone among other atoms 
exclusively. The family of nations and the One World have 
become synonymous. Thus, the abstract human being stands 
outside the whole of the fabricated world, cast out. With no 
33. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 294-295. 
34. Arendt, '''The Rights of Man' What Are They?", 35. 
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place remaining within which another human world can be created, 
the abstract human being can not become concrete again. 
Regardless of treatments, independent of liberties or 
oppression, justice or injustice, [the stateless] have lost 
all those parts of the world and all those aspects of human 
existence which are the result of our common labor, the 
outcome of the human artifice, 35 
And since to be human a person must belong to some world, there 
no longer can be an abstract human being, for once a person is 
abstract, he or she is no longer human. To be cast out of one 
state is to be cast out of humanity. 
Nobody had been aware that mankind, for so long a time 
considered under the image of a family of nations, had 
reached the stage where whoever was thrown out of one of 
these tightly organized closed communities found himself 
thrown out of the family of nations altogether. 36 
And thus, thrown out of humanity. For "the loss of home and 
political status [has] become identical with expulsion from 
humanity altogether." 37 The stateless can not be seen or heard 
by anyone -- not even by other nation-states. The twentieth 
century has taught us that there is no such thing as inalienable 
rights. 
Finally, natural rights theorists attempted to replace 
history with nature as the moral referent. In doing this, they 
became subject to Burke's criticism: that is, nature offers no 
moral reference point at all but merely a biological one. 
Nature leaves humankind morally adrift because it cuts it off 
35. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 300. 
36. Ibid., 294. 
37. Ibid., 297. 
from its world. Civilized human beings become no more and no 
1ess than uncivilized savages. 38 "It is precisely individual 
life which now comes to occupy the positions once held by the 
, life' of the body politic, " 39 so that "to stay alive under all 
circumstances [has J become a holy duty. " 40 
25 
The common element in Burke's and Arendt's thinking is 
their concern with the world's durability. Echoing Burke's idea 
of political inheritance, Arendt claims that the things of the 
world and the web of human relationships gives the human world 
"the stability and solidity without which it could not be relied 
upon to house the unstable and mortal creature which is man." 41 
But more than just stabilizing the natural creature, the world 
offers "mortals a dwelling place more permanent and stable than 
themselves; " 42 it is "a home for men during their life on 
earth. " 43 Furthermore, when Arendt writes of the laws that 
govern the world, as opposed to those which govern nature, she 
shadows Burke by emphasizing equality as a means to communicate 
between generations. "If men were not equal, they could neither 
understand each other and those who come before them nor plan 
for the future and foresee the needs of those who will come 
38. Arendt, "'The Rights of Man' What Are They?", 32. 
39. Arendt, The Human Condition, 314. 
40. Ibid., 316. 
41. Ibid., 136. 
42. Ibid., 152. 
43. Ibid., 173. 
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after them. 1144 
But it is not so much that Arendt agrees completely with 
Burke's position against the Rights of Man as that she 
sympathizes with his position. She asks herself the same 
questions that Burke asks himself: Are we on the brink of doing 
something unforgivable and irredeemable? Are we on the brink of 
destroying our civilization? Like Burke, Arendt links rights to 
the political community, to shared obligation. 
We now know even better than Burke all rights materialize 
only within a given political community, that they depend 
on our fellow-men 45 
As Dossa puts it, "The right to life itself is in jeopardy when 
that right is unsupported by a framework of politics. " 46 Arendt 
seeks to remove human rights from the realm of "charity", where 
she claims the Rights of Man have haphazardly sent them, into 
the realm of obligation. 47 Agreeing with Burke, Arendt holds 
that rights can only be found in the shared obligation that is 
the inheritance of the civilized world. The loss of this world 
brings with it the loss of even human rights, and this loss is 
the tell-tale sign of statelessness. 
Only [the stateless people's] past with its "entailed 
inheritance" seems to attest to the fact that they belong 
44. Ibid., 175. 
4 5. Ibid., 34. 
46. Shiraz Dossa, "Human Status and Politics: Hannah Arendt on 
the Holocaust,'' Canadian Journal of Political Science 13 (1980): 
319. 
47. Young-Bruehl, 257. 
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to the civilized world. 48 
Far from halting the alienation of the stateless from the 
civilized world, naturalistic human rights encouraged it. These 
rights stressed the importance of being part of nature as 
opposed to being part of the civilized world. 
Practical Weaknesses of Human Rights 
But Arendt's critique of natural right and natural rights 
is not simply philosophical. It is practical as well. Even the 
victims of statelessness, she claims, did not rely on human 
rights as a defense against statelessness. 49 In addition to 
being forced to bear an ambiguous legal status, they themselves 
rejected any appeal to the Rights of Man . 
. the victims shared the disdain and indifference of 
the powers that be for any attempt of the marginal 
societies to enforce human rights in any elementary or 
general sense. 50 
The victims had two interrelated criticisms of the Rights of 
Man. 
First, the victims observed that a culture need not have a 
history or be part of another group's history in order to 
qualify for natural rights: 
. natural rights are granted even to savages. 
"inalienable" rights would confirm only the "right of the 
naked savage," and therefore reduce civilized nations to 
48. Arendt, "'The Rights of Man' What Are They?" 32. 
49. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 292. 
50. Ibid., 293. 
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the status of savagery. 51 
No more did they feel that they deserved to be categorized with 
the savages than did they feel that relying on such rights would 
bring them any closer to qualifying for citizen rights. The 
mark of savages is that they are "peoples without a history."~ 
Nations entered the scene of history and were emancipated 
when peoples had acquired a consciousness of themselves as 
cultural and historical entities, and of their territory as 
a permanent home, where history had left its visible traces 
. Wherever nation-states came into being, migrations 
came to an end . 53 
Thus, the liberation of minority nations began with 
"philological revivals" to prove the possession of a history and 
thereby achieve national recognition and territorial 
sovereignty. 54 Purging themselves of a history in order to 
qualify for rights as savages was not only insulting, but, based 
on their observations of national emancipation in Europe and the 
application of Minority treaties, impractical. Absent national 
emancipation, minorities preferred either to assimilate to some 
extent to the nationalities governing the state in which they 
resided or to create an "inter-state web of solidarity." 55 
Second, the stateless saw clearly that the Rights of Man 
had historically been linked to nationality, not statehood. Not 
only did these groups observe that the Rights of Man became 
51. Arendt, "'The Rights of Man' What Are They?", 32. 
52. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 271. 
53. Ibid., 229. 
54. Ibid., 271. 
55. Ibid., 292. 
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linked to national sovereignty during the French Revolution, but 
they also observed the same type of emancipation being sought by 
the various national liberation movements in Eastern Europe, 56 
untreatied minorities knew that they lived within the 
contradiction between national sovereignty and universal rights; 
and they knew that appeals to the Rights of Man would be 
meaningless, for in practice, the Rights of Man were none other 
than the rights of the citizen. 
No matter how [human rights] have once been defined (life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, according to the 
American formula, or as equality before the law, liberty, 
protection of property, and national sovereignty, according 
to the French);. . the real situation of those whom the 
twentieth century has driven outside the pale of the law 
shows that these are rights of citizens . 57 
The distinction between human rights and citizens rights is 
clarified when the connection between the Rights of Man and 
national sovereignty is examined. 
The same essential rights were at once declared as the 
inalienable heritage of all human beings and as the 
specific heritage of specific nations, the same nation was 
at once declared to be subject to [universal] laws, which 
supposedly would flow from the Rights of Man, and 
sovereign, that is, bound by no universal law and 
acknowledging nothing superior to itself. The practical 
outcome of this contradiction was that from then on human 
rights were protected and enforced only as national rights 
58 
Once universal human rights were translated into particularistic 
positive law, they lost their universal quality. Non-citizens, 
56. Ibid., 271. 
57. Ibid., 295. 
58. Ibid., 230. 
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the unenfranchised, could not bring their cases to bear on any 
positive law because the positive law did not recognize them. 
since a state can not be both sovereign and subject at the same 
time, the sovereign state could not recognize any law above 
itself. Human rights "proved to be unenforceable -- even in 
whose countries those constitutions were based on them --
whenever people appeared who were no longer citizens of any 
sovereign state. " 59 
Even if it were possible for a single state to 
institutionalize universal laws, the minorities of Europe had no 
reason, after the negotiations following World War I, to believe 
that any of the European nation-states would. "Never before had 
the Rights of Man. . been a practical political issue, 1160 and 
the untreatied minorities knew from their own experience that 
human rights were only called upon by "those who had nothing 
better to fall back upon. " 61 
Being thus suspect of appeals to nature, untreatied 
minorities instead appealed only to their lost nationality as a 
means to retrieve their political significance . 
. afraid that they might finish by being considered as 
beasts, they insisted on their nationality, the last sign 
of their former citizenship, as their only remaining and 
recognized tie with humanity. 62 
Knowing that human rights would not in any way assure them a 
59. Ibid., 293. 
60. Ibid., 293. 
61. Ibid., 293. 
62. Arendt, "'The Rights of Man' What Are They?" 31. 
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right to take part in history, they appealed to their own 
minority nationality as their most potent argument for including 
them in the historical processes, in the governing, of Europe. 
Even the Eastern European nationalities -- the "people without 
history" -- found such a tactic useful. 63 
According to Arendt, both philosophically and practically, 
human rights were meaningless in the face of statelessness. 
Only by tying their fate to formerly held citizen's rights could 
the stateless hope to regain their concrete human appearance. 
In the end, this hope proved false, but it was at least a 
historically realistic hope in comparison to the "fumbling 
feeble-minded" idealism that human rights fostered. 
The World and Human Diversity 
To Arendt, the rise of statelessness represents a new type 
of apolitical thinking, based obscurely on natural right but 
wholly new. It is apolitical in that it seeks to destroy those 
things upon which politics depends those things which, like 
human action, are mysteriously and unpredictably "given" to 
humankind. The destruction of the given is motivated by a 
mistrust of all things that are not created in the human world. 
The more at home men feel within the human artifice -- the 
more they will resent everything they have not produced, 
everything which is merely and mysteriously given to them. 64 
The central element of such mistrust is the conflict between 
63. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 271. 
64. Arendt, "'The Rights of Man' What Are They?" 32. 
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equality and difference. Whereas in the world we make ourselves 
equal, in nature we each are unique. The world harbors "a deep 
resentment against the disturbing miracle contained in the fact 
that each of us is made as he is -- single, unique, 
unchangeable. 1165 For Arendt, the term "equal" has been 
incorrectly defined by modernity in one sense to mean 
"predictable" or "the same". Humankind shuns all sources of 
unpredictable differentiation in order, it thinks, to assure its 
very survival. 
The reason why highly developed political communities . 
so often insist on ethnic homogeneity is that they hope to 
eliminate as far as possible those natural and always 
present differences and differentiations which by 
themselves arouse dumb hatred, mistrust and discrimination 
because they indicate all too clearly those spheres where 
men cannot act and change at will, i.e., the limitations of 
the human artifice. 66 
But world survival is not possible through such a means: 
. wherever civilization succeeds in eliminating or 
reducing to a minimum the dark background of difference, it 
will end in petrification and be punished, so to speak, for 
having forgotten that man is only the master, but not the 
creator of the world. 67 
Thus, only by accommodating naturally given differences is it 
possible for the world to flourish. 
A significant artifact of Arendt's thinking on this point 
is that she equates ethnic differentiation with the given. Not 
only are individuals "naturally" unique and therefore part of 
65. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 301. 
66. Ibid., 301. 
67. Ibid., 302. 
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the given, but so are peoples. It is central to her argument 
that "alien" peoples threaten the human artifice to such an 
extent that "[humankind] has a distinct tendency to destroy 
[them], 1168 because they are part of the given. Crick clarifies 
Arendt's thoughts by stating that persons were actually thought 
to be "anti-citizens, corruptive of the society, if they were, 
in one instance, of the wrong social class and, in the other 
instance, of the wrong race. " 69 
Peoples who threaten the human artifice are seen by it as 
no less and no more than superfluous to it. They themselves 
belong to a kind of nature, symbolizing the limits to 
humankind's capacity to create and fix the human world. Worse 
than other elements of nature, alien peoples threaten to uproot 
the political world itself. Removed from "the normal restraints 
of politics" European leaders applied the lessons of imperialism 
to Europe. 7° For those involved with negotiating the 
reorganization of Europe, accepting or including such peoples 
would require a radical redirection of politics, which, although 
it might in truth be for the good, because its outcome could not 
be predicted with precision, needed to be avoided at all costs. 
To the extent that the reorganization was preoccupied with 
68. Ibid., 301. 
69. Bernard Crick, "On Rereading The Origins of 
Totalitarianism," chap. in Hannah Arendt: The Recovery of the 
Public World, ed. Melvin A. Hill (New York: St. Martin's Press), 
35. 
7 0 . Ibid. , 3 6. 
political stability, any redirection of politics that produced 
or permitted instability was viewed as being out of the 
question. 
Statelessness becomes a possibility wherever individuals 
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and peoples are thus superfluous to the functioning of the 
world. Once peoples are defined as things belonging to nature, 
they become divorced from the human world, incapable of 
participating in its history. 
If a Negro in a white community is considered a Negro and 
nothing else ... he has become some specimen of an animal 
species, called man. Much the same thing happens to those 
who have lost all distinctive political qualities and have 
become human beings and nothing else. 71 
Returning to a "peculiar state of nature,"n the stateless are 
stripped of the very qualities that signify their belonging to 
the human artifice. 
It seems that a man who is nothing but a man has lost the 
very qualities which make it possible for other people to 
treat him as a fellow-man. 73 
What is lost is the ability of the stateless to be seen and 
heard, to be recognized as part of the company of humankind, as 
a co-author of history; instead, the stateless are thrown back 
into nature. 
To Arendt, human rights which are defended because of their 
inalienable, natural origin can not protect the world from its 
desire to "over-manage'' itself. The priority of stability 
71. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 301-302. 
72. Ibid., 300. 
73. Ibid., 300. 
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brings with it intolerance for anything given. Claiming human 
rights as a defense against the destructiveness of the world 
necessitates no response from the world. Instead, the world can 
only respond to rights that are based on mutual obligation, on 
contractual, negotiated settlements, and on fellowship: on the 
unprecedented mutual understanding that can only result from the 
process of seeing, being seen by, hearing and being heard by 
each other. Traditionally contrived notions of human rights 
have no such qualities or origin. They are not even part of the 
undeniable given; human rights so conceived are not mysteriously 
and unpredictably bestowed upon the world. Arendt suggests that 
traditional notions of human rights have followed the same path 
as have the Rights of Man. They "had never been philosophically 
established but merely formulated, [and] had never been 
politically secured but merely proclaimed." 74 
Peoples who are without a home are better off, according to 
Arendt, when they stress their own history of fellowship within 
their own community. This, at least, provides them a political 
home and, thus, makes them part of humanity. Appeals to 
inalienable human rights, however, carry with them no 
obligation. According to Arendt, they simply permit the world 
to categorize those who claim them as being alien (i.e., of 
nature) and, therefore, superfluous to the human artifice. 
If traditional concepts of human rights are incapable of 
redirecting humankind away from its preoccupation with stability 
74. Ibid., 447. 
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and towards a new preoccupation with world survival, then one is 
left asking whether any conception of human rights can perform 
this task and whether we should do away with the notion of human 
rights entirely. It is to these questions that the discussion 
will now turn. 
CHAPTER 2 
A NEW FOUNDATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 
Arendt is clear that the reorganization of Europe following 
World War I was a failure because there were no philosophical 
constructs or practical applications of human rights that would 
prevent individuals and peoples from being expelled from the 
political world. But the events leading to World War II were 
not isolated and never to be repeated. Arendt sees continuing 
examples of statelessness (for example, the Palestinians) and is 
concerned that statelessness will always be with us. Far from 
being a marginal international phenomenon, Arendt contends that 
statelessness is the beginning of the end for civilization. 1 
As suggested earlier, the creation of statelessness is an 
indication that the human world is beginning to create a new 
sphere of nature against which to define itself. Although the 
threat of the Nazis is over for all intents and purposes, other 
similar threats may present themselves: 
The frightening coincidence of the modern population 
explosion with the discovery of technical devices that, 
through automation, will make large sections of the 
population "superfluous" even in terms of labor, and that, 
through nuclear energy, make it possible to deal with this 
twofold threat by the use of instruments beside which 
Hitler's gassing installations look like an evil child's 
1. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 302. 
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fumbling toys, should be enough to make us trernble. 2 
Beyond the issue of statelessness proper, Arendt foresees the 
creation of other superfluous groups and classes: 
38 
Political, social and economic events everywhere are in a 
silent conspiracy with totalitarian instruments devised for 
making men superfluous ... Totalitarian solutions may well 
survive the fall of totalitarian regimes in the form of 
strong tempations which will come up whenever it seems 
impossible to alleviate political, social, or economic 
misery in a manner worthy of man. 3 
Th furor of anti-communist activity and propaganda in the 1950's 
also convinced Arendt that peoples needed a new type of 
protection -- even in the United States. 4 
Not only does totalitarianism create superfluousness but it 
also permits the annihilation of the superfluous. Arendt hopes 
to purge totalitarian solutions from our repertoire of responses 
to human turmoil. She claims that adopting totalitarian 
solutions reduces humankind to the level of animals. 
The previous chapter detailed Arendt's criticism of notions 
of human rights that are derived from the natural right 
tradition. Although she claims that such notions are 
politically irrelevant, she also claims that the twentieth 
century has taught us lessons that require us to develop a 
relevant notion of human rights. Indeed, developing such an 
idea is one of her own aims. This chapter will begin by 
2. Hannah Arendt, Eichmann In Jerusalem: A Report on the 
Banality of Evil, rev. and enl. (New York: Penguin, 1964), 273. 
3. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 459. 
4. Young-Bruehl, 275. 
examining Arendt's philosophical underpinnings to her human 
rights theory. It will end by defining Arendt's three 
categories of rights, of which human rights is one. 
The Dominance of the Life Process and World Alienation 
39 
Arendt claims that the nightmarish invention of 
superfluousness was related to the substitution of laboring for 
action in the public realm -- both manifestations of world 
alienation. Where humankind had once seen itself as the maker 
"of those fixed permanent standards and measurements which, 
prior to the modern age, have always served him as guides for 
doing and as criteria for his judgment," 5 humankind began to 
raise the process-aspect of fabricating over the creation-aspect 
of fabrication. Although both are fundamentally linked, the 
absence of the creator signals a disregard for the things of the 
world in which previous generations invested themselves: the 
value of consumption was raised over the value of durability. 
It is not so much that humankind lost the capacity to create but 
that it lost the desire to see itself as the fabricator of its 
"permanent" world. As such, it lost the capacity to lay the 
foundation for political activity. This loss demonstrated not 
only a distorted understanding of politics but a distorted 
understanding of fabrication as well. 
Action was soon and still is almost exclusively understood 
in terms of making and fabricating, only that making, 
because of its worldliness and inherent indifference to 
life, was now regarded as but another form of laboring, a 
5. Arendt, The Human Condition, 307. 
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more complicated but not a more mysterious function of the 
life process. 6 
Both action and fabrication lost their original meanings. 
Because the survival of the human world requires that 
durability is a priority, alienation from te world -- as a 
durable entity -- accompanies the emphasis on the life process. 
"Permanence is entrusted to a flowing process, as distinguished 
from a stable structure." 7 The effect of humankind's emphasis 
on process, as opposed to action or fabrication, demonstrates 
that humankind no longer saw itself and its world as distinct 
from nature, but rather as fused with it . 
. man began to consider himself part and parcel of the 
two superhuman, all-encompassing processes of nature and 
history, both of which seemed doomed to an infinite 
progress without ever reaching any inherent telos or 
approaching any pre-ordained idea. 8 
Instead, humankind is distinct from the world it made --
alienated from it. The loss of the world "has left behind it a 
society of men, who without a common world which would at once 
relate and separate them, live either in desperate lonely 
separation or are pressed together in a mass." 9 Even history 
itself, which had once been the catalogue of humankind's 
creation of the world -- a recollection of humankind's stand 
against the unpredictable and arbitrary forces of nature -- now 
6. Arendt, The Human Condition, 322. 
7. Arendt, "History and Immortality," Partisan Review 24 
(1957): 21. 
8. Arendt, The Human Condition, 307. 
9. Arendt, "History and Immortality," 35. 
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became the result of "inevitable" forces that were driven by the 
nature of humankind. Indeed, "Milton was considered to have 
written his Paradise Lost for the same reasons and out of 
similar urges that compel the silkworm to produce silk. " 10 
World alienation's most profound manifestation is 
consumerism. Where once the world consisted "not of things that 
were consumed but of things that were used" 11 , consumerism has 
turned the world into a trading station for solely consumable 
and, therefore, temporary goods. In order to continue the life 
process, "things must be almost as quickly devoured and 
discarded as they have appeared in the world. " 12 Thus, where the 
world at one time represented humankind's effort to extend 
himself into future generations, i.e., the closest approximation 
to permanency that humankind can achieve, consumerism 
demonstrates humankind's effort to devour the world and 
everything in it. For unless the animal laborans keeps 
consuming, it will not survive. Ultimately, consumerism results 
in an anti-human society: 
. without being at home in the midst of things whose 
durability makes them fit for use and for erecting a world 
whose very permanence stands in direct contrast to [mortal] 
life, this life would never be human. 13 
The anti-humanness of human society ends politics, for politics 
can only survive where necessity does not exist. 
10. Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 321. 
11. Ibid., 134. 
12. Ibid., 134. 
13. Ibid., 135. 
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But alienation from the world is only one symptom of the 
rise of consumerism. Arendt holds that humankind has turned 
toward consumption to such a degree that it consumes far beyond 
its need and is aimed at things which humankind has always 
valued for reasons other than need (i.e., politics): 
consumption is no longer restricted to the 
necessities but, on the contrary, mainly concentrates on 
the superfluities of life, [and] harbors the grave 
danger that eventually no object of the world will be safe 
from consumption and annihilation through consumption. 14 
Thus, the public sphere was at one time cleared away as a space 
in which human beings could be free from the necessity of 
consumption. Today, however, the animal laborans rules the 
public realm. In doing so, it makes everything -- not just what 
were once use-objects -- in the world essentially temporary, 
unstable and vulnerable to consumption. Ultimately, destruction 
extends to humankind itself, for through totalitarian regimes, 
consumerism "destroy(s) every trace of what we commonly call 
human dignity." 15 Things that were once valued solely for the 
fact that they were not related to the necessities of life 
become superfluous: these things which were valued by politics, 
such as ethnic diversity, also become superfluous and therefore 
consumable. 
The most clear example of Arendt's view that the rise of 
superfluousness and worldlessness are a corollaries of 
consumerism begins with the expropriation of the peasantry 
14. Ibid., 133. 
15. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 458. 
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during the late middle ages -- a process that would be repeated 
with the creation of statelessness in postwar Germany. The 
expropriation of the peasantry, she argues, is the single most 
important factor leading to the dissolution of feudalism. 16 
Expropriation, the deprivation for certain groups [the 
peasantry] of their place in the world and their naked 
exposure to the exigencies of life, created both the 
original accumulation of wealth and the possibility of 
transforming this wealth into capital through labor .. 
The new laboring class ... stood not only directly under 
the compelling urgency of life's necessity but was at the 
same time alienated from all cares and worries which did 
not immediately follow from the life process itself. 17 
The necessary preoccupation with the life process, in turn, 
robbed the laborers of their capacity to participate in both the 
public and the private spheres. In fact, the loss of the 
private share in the world led to the destruction of the public 
sphere as well. 18 The boundaries between the public and the 
private did not merely shift. They were erased, hence 
destroying both spheres simultaneously. 
The "economic miracle" that Germany displayed during the 
postwar period was nothing more than a highly technological 
version of expropriation, claims Arendt. Germany's experience 
showed that not only could the public and private realms be 
destroyed, but human life itself could be destroyed once the 
process of expropriation was unleashed from its technological 
barriers. 
16. Arendt, The Human Condition, 251-2. 
17. Ibid., 255. 
18. Ibid., 257. 
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The German example shows very clearly that under modern 
conditions the expropriation of the people, the destruction 
of objects, and the devastation of cities will turn out to 
be a radical stimulant for a process, not of mere recovery, 
but of quicker and more efficient accumulation of wealth. 
Such a rapidly accelerating process for the accumulation of 
wealth requires the transformation of all things that might be 
lasting and that might contribute to the durable construction of 
the human world into consumables . 
. a booming prosperity which, as postwar Germany 
illustrates, feeds not on the abundance of material goods 
or on anything stable and given but on the process of 
production and consumption itself. 19 
Thus, consumerism dominated postwar Germany because it was able 
to feed the accumulation of wealth. Any attempt to stop the 
process of consumerism would end in stagnating the economy, 
which came to depend on the sheer transience of goods. 
Under modern conditions, not destruction but conservation 
spells ruin because the very durability of conserved 
objects is the greatest impediment to the turnover 
process, whose constant gain in speed is the only constancy 
left wherever it has taken hold. 20 
The fragility of the relationship between production and 
durability was overturned. The only "constancy" remaining was 
the process of consumption itself; the only stability was 
instability. The relationship between the dominance of 
consumerism and the rise of statelessness now begins to surface. 
19. Ibid., 253. 
20. Ibid., 253. 
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The Effect of Worldlessness on the Human Status 
The destruction of the opposite realms of the human world 
(the public and the private) and the concomitant turning away 
from durability is similarly related to the rise of the nation-
state. It is here that we get to the heart of what will become 
the foundation of Arendt's defense of human rights. Where at 
one time the stability of one's physical place in the world 
guaranteed a private place to which the family could retreat, 
the dominance of animal laborans assured that the privateness of 
the family would disappear. The privacy of the family could not 
be replaced directly. The "old" family was related by biology, 
and it was replaced by the "new" family which was also related 
by biology -- race: 
... just as the family unit had been identified with a 
privately owned piece of the world, its property, society 
was identified with a tangible, albeit collectively owned, 
piece of property, the territory of the nation-state. 21 
Through the nation-state structure, the nation that claimed a 
territory of its own was able to fix for itself some sense of 
privacy and permanence, however imperilled. 
In this way, the nation-state represents an attempt to 
replace what was lost through the process of expropriation 
the loss of the common public world as the basis for human 
action and the loss of the private share of the world are 
mitigated with the gain of a common, single ancestry. The 
function of the nation-state, then, is to re-relate citizens to 
21. Ibid., 256. 
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each other "as family" and to create a new commonality. 
The organic theories of nationalism, especially in its 
Central European version, all rest on an identification of 
the nation and the relationships between its members with 
the family and family relationships. 22 
The familial connection within the nation-state was the center, 
then, of arguments against intra-state racial integration of any 
type. "Homogeneity of population and its rootedness in the soil 
of a given territory became the requisites for the nation-state 
everywhere. " 23 
Taken to its extreme, such as was the case in Germany, the 
ethnic character of the nation-state provided a volatile 
resolution to world alienation. The very fact that the 
resolution was restricted to nationals and that it ignored the 
extant ethnic heterogeneity exasperated the lack of commonality 
among the inhabitants of the territory. The driving force of 
the conflict between the nationals and the minorities (soon to 
become the stateless), hence, was the nation-state itself. In 
addition, the nation-state did not actually resolve world 
alienation for the nationals. The emphasis on biology robbed 
the nationals of their unique political history. Like the 
stateless, the nationals had nothing more than their "abstract 
[biological] humanness" to support their claim to immortality. 
The only difference between the nationals and the stateless was 
the extent to which they had the technological means to exclude 
22. Ibid., 256. 
23. Ibid., 256. 
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the other from what was left of their common world. 
The danger of such a social system is furthered, according 
to Arendt, once the system is internationalized through the 
processes of colonization and imperialism. The danger becomes 
tangible when all of the territory on the face of the earth is 
politically accounted for. 
Just as the family and its property were replaced by class 
membership and national territory, so mankind now begins to 
replace nationally bound societies, and the earth replaces 
limited state territory. 24 
As seen earlier, the colonization of the entire earth means that 
to be excluded from one political entity means being excluded 
from them all. When citizenship is seen as being biologically 
derived, to lose one's citizenship is the same thing as being 
excluded from the human race itself. 
The result of the victory of animal laborans is that 
peoples become superfluous because they "begin to belong to the 
human race in much the same way as animals belong to a specific 
animal species."25 For Arendt, human beings ought to be 
characterized by their capacity to "communicate [themselves] and 
not merely something -- thirst, hunger, affection or hostility 
or fear." 26 Making human beings superfluous recasts them as non-
human. The animal laborans is not interested in speaking and 
acting, but rather in consuming. Thus, the society overtaken by 
24. Ibid., 257. 
25. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 302. 
26. Arendt, The Human Condition, 176. 
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the animal laborans expresses only its thirst and hunger in what 
once was the public realm and it makes it an unfit place for 
human action. 
Earlier, it was mentioned that stateless peoples during the 
reorganization of Europe that followed World War I were likely 
to begin their public claims for national rights by reawakening 
their ethnic language and culture. For Arendt, this is a 
significant piece of evidence on two levels. First, it 
demonstrates stateless peoples' need to tie themselves to world-
making by displaying their past role in world-making. Second, 
philological revivals in particular demonstrated these peoples' 
political, as opposed to biological, humanness. The very 
existence of language testifies to the fact that the individuals 
within the stateless groups were accustomed to revealing 
themselves politically, through speech. It is the commonality 
of the experience of self-revelation, Arendt would argue, that 
the stateless peoples desired to communicate to the majority 
nationalities. By doing so, they hoped to demonstrate that they 
were politically, as well as biologically, human. 
If speech and action become meaningless, it becomes clear 
how, once peoples are redefined as expendable, no rights can be 
proclaimed that have the power to re-insert them into the human 
world. Naturalistic human rights attributed to superfluous 
peoples, for example as were claimed for the stateless, sound 
like the rights invoked by "anti-cruelty to animals societies," 27 
27. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 292. 
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because the stateless are superfluous -- they have become 
defined as animals instead of as humans. Thus, any rights they 
claim can only refer to their biological sameness with peoples 
and persons who possess the rights of citizens. Political 
qualities of stateless individuals can not be seen once 
humankind is dominated by the animal laborans. Human rights, 
traditionally conceived, do not have the power to create a 
platform for speech and action. Any successful attempt to re-
insert the stateless must carry with it the capacity to clear 
away such a platform. 
Three Categories of Rights 
Arendt repeatedly reminds us that "men, not man, inhabit 
the earth." As such, it is plain that "good" politics must be 
based upon the concepts of plurality and diversity. "Rights 
exist only because of the plurality of men, because we inhabit 
the earth together with other men. n28 Thus, if human rights 
can be argued to be politically relevant, they must have the 
capacity to safeguard humankind from its own capacity to 
extinguish diversity, to turn parts of itself back into nature, 
from "[throwing persons] back on their own 
differentiation, " 29 and from casting human beings as mere 
animals. 
In order to be what the world is always meant to be, a home 
for men during their life on earth, the human artifice must 
28. Arendt, "'The Rights of Man' What Are They?" 34. 
29. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 302. 
50 
be a place fit for action and speech, for activities not 
only entirely useless for the necessities of life but of an 
entirely different nature from the manifold activities of 
fabrication by which the world itself and all things in it 
are produced. 30 · 
It is no less than this world -- a home from which no human 
being can possibly be excluded that Arendt hopes to regain 
and protect through a new look at human rights. 
Arendt distinguishes between three types of rights: civil, 
political and human. Instead of relying on the natural right 
tradition, Arendt finds that the political necessity for these 
rights can be discovered in humankind's own political 
experience. 
Civil rights, according to Arendt, are "all of a negative 
character." 31 Building upon her distinction between liberty, to 
be released from oppression, and freedom, to act politically, 
Arendt further identifies liberty with rights that permit 
citizens to have control over their environment, a negative 
component of political influence. Freedom, on the other hand, 
is identified with rights which give citizens the power to act, 
a positive component of political influence. 32 Thus, the 
category of civil rights includes those rights which both 
liberate the individual from and control the advent of tyranny, 
such as the rights to vote and to be represented. These rights 
"claim not a share in government but a safeguard against 
30. Arendt, The Human Condition, 173-4. 
31. Arendt, On Revolution (New York Penguin, 1965), 143. 
32. Ibid., 299. 
government." 33 Fundamentally, they limit the potential of 
government by assuring that it is law-abiding. 
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Civil rights are essentially individualistic in character 
and have their roots in the notion of private happiness, which 
locates true happiness "in the privacy of a home upon whose life 
the public has not claim."N The presupposition of this 
happiness is that no joy can honorably be found in public 
activity. Governmental figures and participants are "not 
supposed to be happy but to labour under a burden." 35 Anyone 
preferring a public life is suspect of possessing greed for 
power and such rulership would necessarily result in despotism. 36 
Thus, Arendt contends that civil rights are anti-political in 
that they draw the individual away from the public realm. 
As opposed to civil rights, political rights rest on the 
discovery of public happiness, on the presupposition that only 
in public is true happiness attainable. Even before the 
American Revolution began, for example, the experience of self-
government convinced the would-be revolutionaries that "they 
could not be altogether 'happy' if their happiness was located 
and enjoyed only in private life. " 37 Political rights permit the 
individual to be an agent of politics, to be a participant; they 
33. Ibid., 143. 
34. Ibid., 129. 
35. Ibid., 128. 
36. Ibid., 128. 
37. Ibid., 127. 
allow the citizen who so desired to "(lay) claim to a share in 
public power. " 38 
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Specifically, this category of rights includes the rights 
to speak and assemble, the two rights which correlate most 
closely with the self-disclosure that is the necessity of the 
vita activa. 39 By being heard and seen in public, the individual 
is "inserted into the human world, and this insertion is like a 
second birth. " 40 Only by becoming part of the human world is it 
possible for a person to be seen as both truly unique from all 
others and truly equal to all others. The co-experience of 
distinction and equality is the "actualization of the human 
condition of plurality." 41 Plurality, then, is the experience 
that is provided by political rights and that results in public 
happiness. 
Arendt contends that once they had discovered political 
rights, the revolutionaries of America and France were too 
entranced by this new form of happiness to be satisfied with 
merely civil, protective rights. 
The men of the revolution . [preferred] under almost 
any circumstances -- should the alternatives unhappily be 
put to them in such terms -- public freedom to civil 
liberties or public happiness to private welfare." 42 
They preferred to discard protection altogether than to deprive 
38. Ibid., 127. 
39. Arendt, The Human Condition, 198-199. 
40. Ibid., 176. 
41. Ibid., 178. 
42. Arendt, On Revolution, 134. 
themselves of the opportunity for public self-disclosure -- a 
deprivation that would result in them living the rest of their 
lives in the unreality of isolation, what they once thought of 
as "private happiness". 
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Unlike civil rights, which are essentially individualistic, 
political rights belong to the individual but protect more than 
just the individual. A benevolent tyrant can grant civil 
rights, for example, but Arendt contends that he or she can not 
grant political rights. 
Tyranny, as the revolutionaries came to understand it, was 
a form of government in which the ruler, even though he 
ruled according to the laws of the realm, had monopolized 
for himself the right of action, banished the citizens from 
the public realm into the privacy of their households, and 
demanded of them that they mind their own, private 
business. Tyranny, in other words, deprived of public 
happiness, though not necessarily private well-being. 
Political rights protect the public world from the invasion of 
this particular form of tyranny. 
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Arendt's last category of rights is her most novel 
contribution to rights theory. Where her defense of civil and 
political rights requires her to harken back to Roman and Greek 
political experiences, her defense of human rights stems solely 
from her own observations of the unprecedented political events 
of the twentieth century. Thus, while she uses the term "human 
rights", she drops from that term any meaning insinuated by its 
historical relation to natural right. As far as Arendt is 
43. Ibid., 130. 
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concerned, the necessity for any rights described as "human" did 
not surface until this century; thus she defines the term in a 
wholly new way, without reference at all to its historical 
usage. 
Since the most important political event of this century 
was the invention of superfluousness, the content of human 
rights, according to Arendt, can be discovered only by 
discovering what things were stripped from persons and peoples 
in Europe following World War I that allowed them to become 
superfluous and, eventually, allowed them to be liquidated. 44 
Arendt contends that two rights were taken from them and that, 
again, neither of the rights had ever been considered rights 
before. 
First, the stateless were stripped of their homes, their 
places in the world which made their words and actions relevant 
to others. 45 Second, the stateless were stripped of the right to 
have rights, not only in their home nation but in all nations. 46 
Under no regime and in no nation-state were they given legal 
status: they belonged nowhere. Arendt goes so far as to 
suggest that slaves' and criminals' human rights are not 
violated because they have both places in the world, although 
perhaps no freedom of movement, and legal status, although no 
political power. However, the stateless were deprived of both: 
44. Arendt, "'The Rights of Man' What Are They?" 24. 
45. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 293-294. 
46. Ibid., 294. 
in the welter of rights of the most heterogenous 
nature and origin, we are only too likely to overlook and 
neglect the one right without which no others can 
materialize -- the right to belong to a political 
community. 47 
Thus, human rights, if they exist at all, must assure that 
individuals, in fact, belong to the human world and that they 
are recognized as belonging by all states. 
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The fact that superfluous persons and peoples belong no 
where -- that they are homeless -- is proof, to Arendt, that 
they are driven from the world by the effects of world 
alienation. The destruction and self-destruction inherent in 
rise of the animal laborans is ultimately played out through 
totalitarian thinking. Therefore, human rights must resolve the 
world alienation born by superfluous, or potentially 
superfluous, peoples and the groups that make them so. 
Where societies are structured around necessity, such a 
resolution can not occur. Since politics requires freedom from 
necessity, human rights must protect a realm in which activities 
will not be driven by biological processes. Kateb summarizes 
her thought when he states that "groups of people must be at 
home in the world if the frame of memorable deeds, the frame of 
political action, is to be secured and strengthened." 48 They 
must lend permanence to the world. Thus, human rights must 
force peoples and individuals to view each other as politically, 
47. Arendt, "'The Rights of Man' What Are They?" 37. 
48. George Kateb, Hannah Arendt: Politics, Conscience, Evil 
(Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allanheld, 1984), 158. 
56 
not just biologically, human. 
Arendt's category of human rights differs fundamentally 
from civil and political rights in that it is intended, not to 
protect the individual or any particular public space. Instead, 
it protectsthe human world itself by clearing away a public 
space above, not just between, and within states. 
[The stateless'] ever-increasing numbers threaten our 
political life, our human artifice, in much the same, 
perhaps even more terrifying, way as wild nature once 
threatened the existence of man-made cities. Deadly danger 
to civilization is no longer likely to come from without . 
. the emergence of totalitarian governments is a phenomenon 
within, not outside, our civilization. 49 
Thus, any protection human rights provide the individual or 
particular governments is incidental to its primary function of 
protecting civilization as a whole. While the ultimate aim is 
to restore human dignity, Arendt holds that no such restoration 
is possible without the fundamental restoration of the 
"permanent" human world. 
As mentioned earlier, Arendt classifies ethnic 
differentiation among the types of individual uniqueness that 
originate in nature. Fundamental, then, to safeguarding persons 
and peoples from being excluded or liquidated because of their 
ethnic diversity are human rights. 
For man has only one right that transcends his various 
rights as a citizen: the right never to be excluded from 
the rights granted by his community (an exclusion which 
occurs not when he is put in jail, but when he is put in a 
concentration camp) and never to be deprived of his 
49. Arendt, "'The Rights of Man' What Are They?" 34. 
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citizenship. 50 
This right, according to Arendt, has the capacity to halt the 
rule of animal laborans and require that the public realm either 
be a place for politics or remain vacant. The right to not be 
excluded, however, is not precisely the same as the right to 
belong. Where belonging implies participation and a certain 
degree of "welcomeness", the right not to be excluded implies 
merely the right not to be tossed away, leaving no trace with 
which historians could detect one's existence. Thus, her 
practical foundation for human rights is very specific the 
rise of superfluousness. And her concern here is only with 
saving the fabricated world -- not with free expression or 
expanded privacy. 
In summary, Arendt contends that human rights are necessary 
to safe-guard the human-made world and, with it, the fact of 
human diversity and the human condition of plurality upon which 
politics is based. Because one of Arendt's most harsh 
criticisms of natural rights is that their inapplicability 
borders on the utopian, it is crucial that she show how her 
notion of human rights can be implemented. Thus, the next 
chapter will describe what crimes offend human rights and what 
types of political or legal institutions can offer an effective 
deterrent to these crimes. We begin by looking at her account 
of the Adolf Eichmann trial. In this account, Arendt clarifies 
what is meant by the term "crimes against humanity" and 
50. Ibid., 36. 
struggles with how human rights can become politically 
compelling in the international arena. 
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CHAPTER 3 
INSTITUTIONALIZING HUMAN RIGHTS 
As noted earlier, because of the nature of her criticisms 
of traditional concepts of human rights, it is especially 
important for Arendt to demonstrate the feasibility of 
implementing her own vision of human rights -- to prove that 
they are politically compelling. However, after diagnosing the 
problems of human rights and prescribing a new vision of them, 
Arendt never directly described her vision of the political and 
legal institutions required to implement them in a comprehensive 
manner. Indeed, most political theorists lay vulnerable to 
sharp criticism in the area of implementation. 
Perhaps, Arendt's failure was due primarily to her being 
disappointed by the precedents set by the World War II war 
crimes trials. It appears clear from her writings on the 
Eichmann trial that she believed that the chance for crucial 
legal and political reforms in the international arena was 
simply passed over. The methods employed in bringing Eichmann 
to "justice" were wholly inadequate, although perhaps 
justifiable. Because of the unprecedentedness of Germany's 
actions and because of the consensus condemning Hitler, for the 
first time in history, a stage was cleared in the international 
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arena for equally unprecedented action which could confirm and 
implement a viable human rights theory. But no one took the 
opportunity to act. The fact that she, for all intents and· 
purposes, never again directly addressed the issue of human 
rights after the publication of Eichmann in Jerusalem lends some 
credence to this hypothesis. In addition, Eichmann's behavior 
during the trial shocked Arendt in the extreme. Her 
preoccupation with crimes against humanity changed its focus 
from political structure to the relation between thought, action 
and responsibility. Thus, she turned to a study of obligation 
that eventually evolved into her final, but incomplete, work The 
Life of the Mind. 1 
Be that as it may, Arendt leaves us a couple of trails to 
follow which can be thought of as routes to the definition for 
her concept of human rights. First, she comprehensively 
criticizes both the legal system that was invented to respond to 
the atrocities committed by Germany prior to and during the 
Second World War, and the political structures that made Germany 
vulnerable to performing such deeds and that held the rest of 
Europe captive to it. Second, many of her remarks that 
accompany these criticisms indicate the direction in which her 
prescription for implementation might go. Unfortunately, she 
frequently contradicts herself or is so vague that her position 
-- beyond its very general components -- can not be deciphered 
with any precision. For these reasons, Arendt's criticisms of 
1. Young-Bruehl, 375f. 
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the legal and political structures will be dealt with as fully 
as possibl, along with her less comprehensive criticisms of 
prescriptions which were put forth by other theorists. The ·1ast 
two sections of the chapter will summarize the seeds of what 
might have been Arendt's plan for implementation. 
The Appearance of Crimes Against Humanity 
In Eichmann in Jerusalem, Arendt discusses, first, what was 
unprecedented about the rise and extermination of the stateless 
and, second, what has been done politically and legally in order 
to prevent these events from occurring once again. Her motive 
for looking to legal processes which have the capacity to halt 
crimes against humanity rests on the presupposition "that the 
unprecedented, once it has appeared, may become a precedent in 
the future." 2 
Clearly and somewhat superficially, one thing that was new 
about the rise of statelessness was that it required a new 
category of criminal code: crimes against humanity. To place 
this new category in historical perspective, Arendt classifies 
each of the crimes of the Nazis. The first crime was the 
legalization of discrimination within Germany. This crime was 
institutionalized in the Nuremberg Laws which created a second 
class of citizenship to which Jews irreversibly and 
automatically belonged. The Nuremberg Laws "violated national, 
constitutional rights and liberties, but [they] were of no 
2. Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, 273. 
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concern to the comity of nations." 3 While it might be said that 
this set of crimes denied Jews political rights and severely 
limited their civil rights, it can not be said to have offended 
their human rights which were not violated until the Jews were 
actually deprived of their citizenship. 
The second crime that the Nazis committed was an 
international one -- officially termed "enforced emigration". 
Expulsion ... [concerned] the international community, 
for the simple reason that those who were expelled appeared 
at the frontiers of other countries, which were forced 
either to accept the uninvited guests or to smuggle them 
into another country ... 4 
Forcing persons into another country's territory is an act of 
aggression between two nations. Any legal recourse that 
nations, peoples or persons have is limited to agreements and 
treaties that are negotiated between, not above, nations. Thus, 
although the rootlessness in which this crime resulted appeared 
to be an offense against human rights, the crime had no direct 
relation to the rights of persons or peoples but merely to the 
rights of nations. Only international law was violated. Even 
though persons were deprived of their homes by the Nazis, this 
deprivation alone was not an offense against human rights, 
according to Arendt. It is not the deprivation of a home itself 
that the stateless experienced but the impossibility of finding 
a new one. The fact that the states into which the stateless 
were imported did not welcome them was a crime against humanity. 
3. Ibid. , 2 68. 
4. Ibid., 2 68. 
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However, this crime was not committed by the Nazis. 
The final crime that the Nazis perpetrated was the 
extermination of "the Jews and the people of several other 
nations." Extermination was not limited to German Jews but was 
aimed at "[making] the entire Jewish people disappear from the 
face of the earth." 5 Whereas expulsion is a crime against other 
nations, genocide "is an attack upon human diversity as such, 
that is, upon a characteristic of the 'human status' without 
which the very words 'mankind' or 'humanity' would be void of 
meaning. 116 
This last crime offends human rights on two counts. In 
order to exterminate the Jews, the Nazis had to strip them of 
their citizenship and turn them into a stateless people. This, 
ironically, was how Israel justified kidnapping and trying 
Eichmann. 
It was Eichmann's de facto statelessness, and nothing else, 
that enabled the Jerusalem court to sit in judgement on 
him. Eichmann, though no legal expert, should have been 
able to appreciate that, for he knew from his own career 
that one could do as one pleased with stateless people; the 
Jews had had to lose their nationality before they could be 
exterminated. 7 
As mentioned above, because other states did not welcome the 
Jews into their borders, the Jews became stateless. Once done, 
the Nazis would not be held responsible for their fate. 
The creation of the person-category called stateless, 
5. Ibid., 2 68. 
6. Ibid., 268-269. 
7. Ibid., 240. 
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however, did not itself necessarily result in the limitation or 
extermination of human diversity. The crime against humanity is 
really two crimes. 8 By excluding a people from the public 
sphere and deeming them stateless, the Nazis terminated the 
human condition of plurality -- the first offense against human 
rights. The termination of plurality, as mentioned above, was 
necessary before "one could do as one pleased with [the Jews]." 
Once the Jews held the non-status of stateless, the very 
fact of human diversity could be erased. The act of genocide 
the second offense against human rights -- sought to terminate 
the human diversity upon which the human condition of plurality 
is grounded: 
... [genocide] is an attack upon human diversity as such, 
that is, upon a characteristic of the "human status" 
without which the very words "mankind" or "humanity" would 
be devoid of meaning. 9 
In other words, Arendt suggests that, since plurality is 
dependent on diversity, the elimination of plurality (political 
equality) must precede the elimination of diversity (natural 
differentiation). The first is a crime against humanity because 
persons or peoples are deprived of their political homes which 
make their actions and speech meaningful. The stateless were 
transformed into non-humans and cast out into "a peculiar state 
of nature." The second is a crime against humanity because its 
aim is to fundamentally change what it means to be human -- that 
8. Dossa, 31 7. 
9. Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, 266-267. 
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is, diverse in nature and plural in the polis. While the 
elimination of plurality divests peoples or persons of their 
human identity, the second divests humanity itself of its human 
identity. Note that no where does Arendt suggest that the 
individual qua individual has been violated. 10 
International Legal Deterrents 
Once crimes against humanity became possible it also became 
conceivable that they would become precedents for a multitude of 
other attempts to erase the fact of human diversity. Arendt 
holds that "once a specific crime has appeared for the first 
time, its reappearance is more likely than its initial emergence 
could ever have been." 11 Such a crime can be deterred by way of 
an equally unprecedented legal process or political action. 
If genocide is an actual possibility of the future, then no 
people on earth ... can feel reasonably sure of its 
continued existence without the protection of international 
law. 12 
Arendt criticizes the legal proceedings against Eichmann because 
they did not set this precedent. 
Although the Jerusalem court that sat in judgement over 
Eichmann was capable of trying crimes against the Jewish people, 
it was wholly incapable of trying crimes in which "the 
international order, and mankind in its entirely, might have 
10. Dossa, 318. 
11. Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, 273. 
12. Ibid., 273. 
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been grievously hurt and endangered." 13 In addition to the fact 
that it was not capable of creating the type of unprecedented 
legal process that the crime against humanity required as a 
deterrent, the Israeli court, like the Nuremberg and the 
Successor courts, was stricken with "extreme reluctance ... to 
break fresh ground and act without precedents." 14 The Israeli 
court, however, was especially reluctant to break precedent 
because the Jews generally were unable to recognize the 
unprecedented nature of the crime against them. Instead, they 
saw it as merely the most recent and grievous crime committed by 
the Nazis against the Jews. 15 Thus, they saw no qualitative 
break between the legalization of discrimination and genocide, 
although Arendt clearly does, as discussed above. Admitting 
that Israel had few options under the circumstances, Arendt is 
concerned that the opportunity was lost to set an international 
legal precedent that would be enacted above, not just between, 
nations. 
It is unclear from Eichmann in Jerusalem, though, whether 
Arendt sees any court system -- international or otherwise 
as having the capacity to set this legal precedent: 
. in consequence of this yet unfinished nature of 
international law, it has become the task of ordinary trial 
judges to render justice without the help of. 
positive, posited laws. For the judge, this may be a 
predicament, and he is only too likely to protest that the 
"single act" demanded of him is not his to perform but is 
13. Ibid., 276. 
14. Ibid., 262. 
15. Ibid., 267. 
the business of the legislator . 
. It must be admitted furthermore that [the failures 
of the Jerusalem court] were neither in kind or in degree 
greater than the failures of the Nuremberg Trials or the 
Successor trials in other European countries. 16 
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Thus, while much of the volume is dedicated to criticizing the 
Jerusalem court and its methods of bringing Eichmann to justice, 
Arendt indicates that the Jerusalem court, as well as the 
Nuremberg court, was doomed to failure because the nature of 
courts is to interpret the pre-existing law for individual cases 
not to create law, unprecedented or otherwise. 
A call for positive law to deter the perpetration of crimes 
against humanity is not made in Eichmann, except indirectly as 
in the passage quoted above. The implications of Arendt's 
dissatisfaction with a legal -- as opposed to a political --
remedy to crimes against humanity are far-reaching. For a 
fuller treatment of them, we must return to Arendt's critique of 
the nation-state system. 
The Personification of the State 
As mentioned in the first chapter, Arendt's criticism of 
traditional human rights can not be articulated without mention 
of her criticism of the nation-state. Through this latter 
criticism, she evolves a response to the inadequacies of the 
nation-state system as the steward of human rights. 
The most fundamental loss that the rise of nationalism has 
presented is the loss of universality. Whereas, in the Ancient 
16. Ibid., 274. 
days of Rome, Arendt believes, civilization was structured 
around universal political values, the rise of the nation 
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represents the development of particular, contingent authority. 
One of the main phenomena of the modern world is that 
civilization has renounced its old claim to universality 
and presents itself in the form of a particular, national 
civilization. 17 
The loss of universal authority needs to be dealt with directly, 
claims Arendt, for if any idea of human rights is to carry a 
universal quality, a universal authority must exist. However, 
after further examination, it becomes clear that Arendt does not 
think that a new universal authority needs to be framed 
perhaps such an authority can not be framed at all. Rather, she 
suggests that all contingent forms of authority be subject 
merely to the rule of impartial law. If substantive universal 
values have been lost, perhaps law can at least refrain from 
promoting one set of values over another. 
Arendt recognizes the difficulty in laws that prefer one 
set of ideals over another. In doing so, she recognizes the 
uniqueness of each nation and its right to retain its way of 
life. Instead of requiring all nations to sacrifice their 
uniqueness to the state, Arendt regards the importance of 
nations' uniqueness as worth preserving because, from it, 
springs a people's history. 
A people becomes a nation when "it takes conscience of 
itself according to its history"; as such it is attached to 
the soil which is the product of past labor and where 
17. Arendt, "The Nation," Review of Politics 8 (1946): 138. (A 
review of J.T. Delos, La Nation. Montreal: Editions de 
l' Arbre.) 
history has left its traces. It represents the "milieu" 
into which man is born, a closed society to which one 
belongs by right of birth. 18 
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Arendt contends that the nation is the place of belonging, the 
center of meaning for new lives. Because it is a closed 
society, it is to some extent a private place into which 
individuals retreat in order to form their own identities. 
However, it is public, in that it holds its own history, which 
is its story about its foundation and continued survival in the 
world. Thus, the nation is essentially a geographically stable, 
closed entity. 
Arendt juxtaposes the idea of the nation with the idea of 
the state, an organization with completely different functions 
and purposes. 
The state on the other hand is an open society, ruling over 
a territory where its power protects and makes the law. As 
a legal institution, the state knows only citizens no 
matter of what nationality; its legal order is open to all 
who live on its territory. 19 
The state is truly and only public. While it affords persons 
and peoples a private sphere, it and all of its components are 
completely exposed. Where the nation is exclusive, the state is 
inclusive with porous boundaries through which all types of 
persons, peoples and territories may pass. 
Thus, an important difference between the nation and the 
state is the permanence of its place in the world and its 
structure. 
18. Ibid., 139. 
19. Ibid., 139. 
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As a power-institution, the state may claim more territory. 
[however, the nation] has put an end to migrations. 20 
Where the nation's boundaries are necessarily permanent -- set 
by the nation's historical tie to a particular parcel of land 
the state's boundaries are temporary, always subject to the 
strength of its drive for additional territory. 
The distinction between nation and state having been made 
clear, Arendt holds that the troubles of modern Europe center 
around the confusion of this distinction in practice. 
Nationalism signifies essentially the conquest of the state 
through the nation. 21 
Nationalism occurs when the state is owned or dominated by one 
nation. When this occurs, the state takes on the character of 
the nation while retaining parts of the character of the state. 
What it loses is its impartiality. For example, in the nation-
state system, the Rights of Man are construed as the rights of 
nationals, thus being exclusive, not inclusive, rights. 
The result of XIX century identification of nation and 
state is twofold: while the state as a legal institution 
has declared and must protect the rights of men, its 
identification with the nation implied the identification 
of the national and the citizen and thereby resulted in the 
confusion of the Rights of Men with the rights of nationals 
or with national rights. 22 
What the nation gains is military strength. Armed with the 
power-advancing goals of the state, the nation-state takes on 
the identity of the nation. Thus, nation-states become 
20. Ibid., 139. 
21. Ibid., 139. 
22. Ibid., 139. 
aggressors for increased territory. 
Furthermore, insofar as the state is an "enterprise of 
power," aggressive and inclining to expansion, the nation 
through its identification with the state acquires all 
these qualities and claims expansions now as a national 
right 23 
Such expansionism, however, loses the impartial, porous 
complexion that it bore in the hands of the state. 
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Thus, the nation, not accustomed to being subject to any 
higher authority -- since universal authority was lost with 
universal civilization -- became sovereign. Not permitting 
itself to be subject to any universal authority, not admitting 
any limit to its power, and not requiring a public sphere in 
which "power can be checked by power" -- because the nation-
state is essentially a private construction -- the nation-state 
was freed to pursue totalitarian goals. 
The conquest of the state through the nation started with 
the declaration of the sovereignty of the nation. This was 
the first step transforming the state into an instrument of 
the nation which finally has ended in . totalitarian 
forms of nationalism ... It is the nation which has 
usurped the traditional place of God and religion. 24 
The zeal and absolutism which characterized the nation-states' 
quest for power could not be checked by any domestic pressure, 
for the nation-states did not represent a plurality but a single 
people. Thus, there were no spaces within the nation-states 
which were cleared away for the exercising of political power. 
Since only power can balance power, the power of the nation-
23. Ibid., 139. 
24. Ibid., 139. 
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state, with no interior balance, was left unchecked. 
In addition, the inability of international sources of 
power to limit the aggression inherent in the nation-state was 
due to the lense through which the nation-state was viewed -- it 
was not perceived as a plural entity: 
... the sovereignty of the nation was shaped after the 
model of the sovereignty of the individual ... The state 
conquered by the nation became the supreme individual 
before which all other individuals had to bow. 
This is the personification of the state, achieved through 
its conquest by the nation and shaped after the model of 
the autonomous individual, which first brought into 
existence that "individualization of the moral universal 
within a collective," . . . 25 
The nation-state's rights and duties were based upon nothing 
other than individual rights and duties. Other states spoke of 
Germany's rights just like they spoke of the rights of a single 
person. Within the nation-state structure, as with the 
individual, only private interests were articulated -- not 
public ones. The loss of commonality between a multiplicity of 
private interests, which had at one time been the nadir of the 
public realm, had been replaced by one, singular, national, 
private, "familial" interest. In its most extreme form, the 
completely privatized public sphere chooses its own aspect. 
Like the nation, only now with no limits, the nation-state was 
one creature, not a conglomeration of many persons and peoples 
and it was treated as such by other international powers. With 
this new capacity, it was freed from every restraint to which a 
state is subject. 
25. Ibid., 140. 
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This is the way in which nationalism becomes fascism: the 
"Nation-State" transforms or rather personifies itself into 
the totalitarian state. 26 
As one person, the nation-state takes on a character that is 
defined by itself or by one person or by one set of ideas, no 
matter how disputable. No plurality or standard of even logic 
restrains it. 
But Arendt elucidates these extremes of the nation-state 
not simply to repeatedly condemn the totalitarian forms of 
government so far evidenced. Rather, she points to the fact 
that totalitarianism is nested within the nation-state's 
political structure itself. No matter how benign any particular 
nation-state may seem to be, the structure of the nation-state 
itself masks what might be thought of as "latent" totalitarian 
movements. 
There is little doubt that civilization will be lost if 
after destroying the first forms of totalitarianism we do 
not succeed in solving the basic problems of our political 
structures. 27 
Thus, in order to end the possibility of totalitarianism, Arendt 
holds that our current political structures must be radically 
altered. 
International Political Deterrents 
In the first chapter, Arendt's defense of Burke's criticism 
of the Rights of Man was described. However, it is a mistake to 
26. Ibid., 140. 
27. Ibid., 140. 
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think that Arendt presumes that Burke's response to the events 
of the eighteenth century is sufficient for the events of the 
twentieth century. The fundamental limitation of Burke's 
critique is that it preserves the nation-state system in Europe, 
which Arendt claims has been shown to be inherently flawed. 
Like Burke, Arendt is concerned that civilization is at a 
turning-point. Burke feared that the end of English 
civilization would occur if English politics was invaded by 
French notions of the "universal" Rights of Man. Arendt fears 
that the end of all of civilization will occur if the nation-
state can not admit a political authority higher than itself. 28 
Burke's response is insufficient for Arendt because the 
twentieth century has taught us things that Burke could not have 
possibly known. 
First, Burke's response to the French Revolution is 
insufficient to combat totalitarianism because it does not take 
account of the new, global nature of politics. This critique of 
Burke rests on the fact that he presupposes that there is a 
multitude of political communities from which rights can spring. 
While this presupposition was not unwarranted when he wrote, 
according to Arendt, it is obsolete now. Arendt agrees with 
Burke that rights can only be established within a political 
community -- they can not be pressed upon it from outside, as 
was attempted in the French Revolution. 29 However, she also 
28. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 230. 
29. Arendt, On Revolution, 149. 
75 
acknowledges that Burke's reference to a "given political 
community" implies variability of community and that now, in the 
twentieth century, there is only one political community, One 
World. 30 Thus, the "common world" from which the stateless are 
alienated is the singular, global world of humankind. 
The result of the globalization of politics is that a type 
of universality is forced upon rights that are established 
within this global political community. In other words, if 
rights spring from the political community and if there is only 
one such community, then, logically, rights take on a universal, 
though perhaps not absolute, quality. 
This brings us to Arendt's second critique -- that the 
events of this century make universal rights a necessity for the 
preservation of humanity. What Arendt contributes is not an 
appeal to the rights of Englishmen, nor an appeal to a higher 
order, but something in between these two extremes. 
But we also know that apart from all so-called [e.g., 
traditionally contrived notions of] human rights, which 
change according to historical and other circumstances, 
there does exist one right that does not "spring from 
within the nation" and which needs more than national 
guarantees: it is the right of every human being to 
membership in a political community. 31 
Once the political community has become universalized -- once 
the political reference point is above the nation-state --
rights can be conceived both that are universal in quality and 
that spring from a given political community. 
30. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 297. 
31. Arendt, "'The Rights of Man' What Are They?" 34. 
Thus, what initially appears as a contradiction in her 
political thought -- that rights spring only from the activity 
of plurality and that the Nazis should be condemned for 
committing crimes against humanity (a crime that relies on a 
notion of human rights that seems completely apolitical) -- is 
resolved by universalizing the political community from which 
rights spring. According to Arendt, rights no longer "spring 
from within the nation" but from the One World, the history of 
which is written, for the first time, by all of humanity. 
History -- "organized remembrance" 32 -- is no longer English, 
French, Jewish or German, but rather Human. 
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The international implications of the universalization of 
politics are far-reaching. First, while the universal political 
community may exist, it has not yet been internationally 
acknowledged or institutionalized. This is demonstrated by the 
fact that all attempts to achieve the acceptance of universal 
human rights have ignored the fact that such rights require a 
universal political community from which to spring. 
Contrary to the best-intentioned humanitarian attempts to 
obtain new declarations of human rights from international 
organizations, it should be understood that this idea 
transcends the present sphere of international law which 
still operates in terms of reciprocal agreements and 
treaties between sovereign states; and, for the time being, 
a sphere above the nations does not exist. 33 
32. Arendt, The Human Condition, 197-198. 
33. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 298, emphasis 
added. 
Arendt claims that institutionalization is justified and, in 
fact, required, because it is possible, for the first time in 
history, to offend humanity itself, not just parts of it: the 
precedent of committing crimes against humanity has been set. 
Thus, 
the emergence of mankind as one political entity, 
makes the new concept "crimes against humanity" ... the 
first and most important notion of international law .. . 
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with this notion international law transcends its present 
sphere, which has to do only with those laws and agreements 
that, in peace and war, regulate the intercourse of 
sovereign nations, and enters the sphere of a law that is 
above the nations. 34 
Arendt calls upon the international political community to 
recognize super-national law and make human rights universal. 
Super-national laws require super-national institutions. 
Therefore, unlike Burke, Arendt appears to see no point in 
conserving the institutions of the past: the international 
institutions have already been shown to be completely inadequate 
-- in fact, they have been uprooted by these new crimes and they 
can not be reclaimed. But while it is clear that Arendt hopes 
to achieve an acknowledgement of this one international 
community, it is also clear that she does not seek to replace 
the nation-state system with a world government, an idea that 
elicits suspicion from her: 
... a world government is indeed within the realm of 
possibility, but one may suspect that in reality it might 
differ considerably from the version promoted by 
idealistic-minded organizations. 35 
34. Arendt, "'The Rights of Man' What Are They?" 36. 
35. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 298. 
Any single sovereign government is just as likely to make the 
mistakes that have been made over and over by single sovereign 
nation-states. 
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For it is quite conceivable, and even within the realm of 
practical political possibilities, that one fine day a 
highly organized and mechanized humanity [governed by a 
single world government] will conclude quite democratically 
-- namely by majority decision -- that for humanity as a 
whole it would be better to liquidate certain parts 
thereof. 36 
Here is demonstrated again Arendt's profound dissatisfaction 
with absolute sovereignty. Fearing a repeat of the nation-
state-territory trinity that permitted nationalities in Europe 
to hold the reigns of power over minorities, Arendt is extremely 
uncomfortable with power that is unchecked by other spheres of 
power. 
The presently popular notion of a World Government is based 
. on the [Hobbesian] concept of individuals submitting 
to a central authority which "overawes them," except that 
nations are now taking the place of individuals. The World 
Government [would] overcome and eliminate authentic 
politics, that is, different peoples getting along with 
each other in the full force of their power. 37 
Just as the American formula of federalism is praised because, 
as mentioned earlier, the American revolutionaries recognized 
that "tyranny and sovereignty are the same" and therefore 
devised a form of government that permitted power to be checked 
by power, 38 so Arendt suggests that any international law-giving 
authority must be both universally acknowledged and checked by 
36. Ibid., 299. 
37. Ibid., 142. 
38. Arendt, On Revolution, 152-154. 
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other spheres of power. 
Rather than terminating national sovereignty, Arendt wants 
to re-awaken the limits to national sovereignty that had been 
set, for utilitarian purposes, in the past. 
Theoretically, in the sphere of international law, it had 
always been true that sovereignty was no where more 
absolute than in matters of "emigration, naturalization, 
nationality, and expulsion"; the point, however, is that 
practical consideration and the silent acknowledgement of 
common interests restrained national sovereignty until the 
rise of totalitarian regimes. 39 
If national sovereignty is limited again, appeals to human 
rights can be politically and philosophically "heard" between 
and within nation-states. However, national sovereignty can 
only be limited by another sphere of political power. 
Thus, Arendt moves beyond Burke's criticism of the Rights 
of Man, armed with the experience of the twentieth century. 
Whereas Burke was preoccupied with preserving English 
civilization, Arendt is concerned with opening a new space in 
which a new, higher layer of political discourse can occur so 
that, not just English civilization but, the whole of human 
civilization can be preserved. Only in such a political context 
can human rights take on the universal quality that they require 
for enforcement and can crimes against humanity be successfully 
deterred. 
39. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 278, emphasis 
added. 
80 
Intranational Political Deterrents 
It is a mistake to think that Arendt offers only one 
solution to the problem of how to implement human rights. Her 
approach contains a second component: changing the political 
structure of the nation-state. Arendt would like to see the 
distinction that she makes between nation and state put into 
practice. When such a distinction is made, the behavior of 
nations would be checked by other spheres of power within the 
state; indeed, the state would no longer be a nation-state. 
Thus, the sovereignty of the nations would be limited, not by 
outside forces, but by the state itself. These limitations, she 
thinks, would be more effective because they would spring from 
the political community itself. 
As mentioned above, Arendt praises the American federal 
formula for creating a sphere in which power could check power -
-although it does not go far enough. 40 The power-checking 
mechanism inherent in federalism is directed in a different 
dimension than is that in the separation of powers between the 
three branches of government. Where the separation of powers 
was intended to prevent the rise of a powerful monarch (tyranny 
from above), federalism, which creates many spheres of power, 
prevents the rise of factions (tyranny from below). Arendt 
contends that, in Europe, the lack of additional spheres of 
power permitted the state to become the nation-state. 
Disagreeing with the interpretations of the founders that these 
40. Arendt, On Revolution, 249. 
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preventive measures resulted in robbing all parties of political 
power, Arendt argues, on the other hand, that federalism 
actually increased power by creating an environment in which 
power would never be left unckecked. Thus, federalism is 
solicitous of power. 
Clearly the true objective of the American Constitution was 
not to limit power but to create more power, actually to 
establish and duly constitute an entirely new power center 
41 
The new power center is the power balance between the states and 
the federal government, dislocated from the center of 
administrative activities. 
Arendt goes on to argue for a system that could be adopted 
by European nation-states. The council system, a very localized 
federation such as the one that arose during the Hungarian 
Revolution of 1956, would make significant headway in fighting 
nationalism. Without the assistance of "professional 
revolutionaries," the councils were innocent of pre-
revolutionary plans for the post-revolutionary society. They 
were founded on mutual trust. In addition, "their sole demand 
was for freedom" not economic liberation. 42 As another 
commentator points out, Arendt admired that, unlike other 
attempts at a council system, the Hungarian councils were purely 
41. Ibid., 154. 
42. Gabriel Masooane Tlaba, Politics and Freedom: Human Action 
and Will in the Thought of Hannah Arendt (New York: University 
Press of America, 1987), 59. 
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political and not burdened with administrative preoccupations. 43 
The party system, on the other hand, does not encourage 
individual participation. Rather, it provides only 
representation. 
The conflict between the two systems, the parties and the 
councils, came to the fore in all twentieth-century 
revolutions. The issue at stake was representation versus 
action and participation. The councils were organs of 
action, the revolutionary parties were organs of 
representation . . . 44 
Where the parties sought to build a structure in which action 
would be limited to the founding of the new state, councils 
sought to build a system in which action could be 
institutionalized, bringing a balance of action and order. 45 
But, she claims very little political thought has been 
devoted to this type of federalism. According to Arendt, this 
system of "elementary republics" is generally ignored by 
historians -- even those sympathetic to revolution remain 
ignorant of its unprecedented nature: 
[historians] failed to understand to what extent the 
council system confronted them with an entirely new form of 
government, with a new space for freedom which was 
constituted and organized during the course of the 
revolution itself. 46 
Presuming that the council system was nothing more than a 
temporary structure that held the state together until the 
43. Margaret Canovan, The Political Thought of Hannah Arendt 
(London: J.M. Dent and Sons, 1974), 99. 
44. Arendt, On Revolution, 273. 
45. Ibid., 271. 
46. Ibid., 249. 
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revolution ended, historians and revolutionaries expected 
stability and quiet to follow the revolution. Arendt expects 
political, although not structural, fluidity -- not, it seems, 
stability. 
Arendt goes on to contend that the federal system is the 
only alternative to the nation-state that has the capacity to 
control ethnic hegemony because it is the only system in which 
powerful factions or parties can not, for all intents and 
purposes, rule the state. 47 Instead of increasing the power of 
"the many", the council system, properly conceived, increased 
the power of "every one".« By dividing the many into small 
groups, each individual's actions count, because they are seen 
and heard by fellow citizens. Thus, Arendt insists that the 
council system's political organ is the individual. 
Arendt applies this claim to her critique of the nation-
state system elsewhere, emphasizing again the power-balancing 
capacity of federalism: 
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. the larger need of our civilization with its "growing 
unity" on one side, and its growing national 
conscientiousness of peoples on the other, would be met 
with the idea of federation. Within federated structures, 
nationality would become a personal status rather than a 
territorial one. 49 
With nationality thus kept under tight limits, by returning it 
to the private sphere and by recreating the public sphere, the 
47. Ibid., 166. 
48. Ibid., 254. 
49. Arendt, "The Nation," 141. 
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state can then take on the responsibility of protector of rights 
and the individual, not the group, becomes the medium for 
politics. 
Thus, the proper form of the "country" is the state, 
impartial and fluid. And the state, stripped of the nation, is 
the only organ through which rights can honestly be defended and 
safe-guarded. 
The state. is the supreme protector of a law which 
guarantees man his rights as man, his rights as citizen and 
his rights as a national ... and this function is not at 
all affected through the number of nationalities which are 
protected within the framework of its legal institutions. 50 
The limit, then, to national sovereignty is not only potentially 
found by creating a sphere for action above nations. In 
addition, it can be found by creating a sphere for action within 
nations through the council system. 
Thus, Arendt presents two options with which to implement 
her notion of human rights. It seems clear that the 
intranational implementation strategy is preferred by her -- she 
has fewer hesitations about it. While an international solution 
is considered, no one, specific, international solution can be 
adopted without strong reservations on her part. 
50. Ibid., 141. 
CHAPTER 4 
CONCLUSION 
Earth poetizes, field to field 
with trees interlinear, and lets 
us weave our own paths around 
the plowed land, into the world. 
People go about, no one is lost. 
Arendt, 1952 
Arendt wrote these verses during one of her early trips to 
Paris after the close of the Second World War. The lines 
indicate that much of her personal distress over the events of 
the war was beginning to dissipate. 1 This first celebratory 
poem envisions a new world in which "no one is lost," a telling 
reminder of the centrality that the themes of rootlessness and 
world alienation play in her political thinking. The "joke" 
which had played over and over in her own mind since her 
imprisonment in 1939 was finally mute -- although it would 
certainly speak again. 
Arendt's criticism of traditional human rights emphasizes 
their inability to bring individuals and peoples "into the 
world." Instead of connecting them to the world, such rights 
1. Young-Bruehl, 264. 
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disperse individuals further into nature, into pure, unreal 
abstraction. Thus, they cannot hope to dissolve the alienation 
that permits individuals and peoples to be thought of and 
treated as superfluous, as not belonging. 
Arendt's thoughts concerning human rights attempt to answer 
this critical weakness. By examining what forces drove human 
beings out of their world, she strives to determine what forces 
will bring them back. Only by becoming a part of the world once 
again can individuals and peoples hope to find political freedom 
and access their true active "natures". 
Like traditional human rights theorists, Arendt links her 
notion of human rights to her understanding of what it means to 
be human: diverse in nature and plural in the polis. However, 
as Arendt points out, the necessity for human rights does not 
come merely from this logical connection but from the peril in 
which humankind finds itself during the twentieth century. 
Human rights are necessary because we have lost touch with the 
human condition. And this last claim is based on hard, 
empirical fact: we now have observed the abstract human being 
in physical form. Therefore, human rights must be matched to 
what this abstract human being looks like -- not to what we 
think it might look like. 
Traditional human rights theorists can not be said to have 
done this. Rather, they take the solution of nineteenth 
century's problems and apply it to today's problems without 
pausing to question whether the two sets of problems are the 
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same. Like the Isreali court, traditional human rights 
theorists argue that genocide represents just one more in a long 
series of examples, albeit a radical one, of crimes that states 
have committed against the individual. Totalitarianism is 
merely a new form of tyranny. Genocide is the murder of many, 
many individuals. 
Arendt disagrees. Totalitarianism and tyranny are not the 
same thing; genocide and murder are not the same thing. What 
the twentieth century has witnessed is the transformation of the 
public realm into an instrument not of a particularly evil 
individual but of an anti-world ideology. Traditional theories 
of human rights may have the capacity to dissolve tyranny, but 
they completely lack the capacity to fight totalitarianism. 
Since the disease is new, a new therapy must be created and 
prescribed. 
The root of Arendt's diagnosis is not that human rights 
were denied the Jews or anyone else. Rather, civilization as a 
whole, she believes, could self-destruct because human beings 
have lost touch with their own defining characteristic: human 
beings do not know what it means to be political because they do 
not know what it means to be plural. Under such circumstances, 
Arendt asks, can we call ourselves human at all? If not, what 
is to become of us? 
In addition to the fact that she contends that the 
traditional notions of human rights did not help the stateless 
peoples and persons, she does not see human rights violations as 
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the cause of statelessness. Such theories of human rights were 
merely a therapy prescribed by most liberal theorists that did 
no good. Like a placebo, they may have made individuals feel 
better, but the prescribing them was essentially wasted effort. 
In Arendt's analysis, the concept of human rights must be 
completely revamped before it can be an effective therapeutic 
tool. 
First, Arendt contends that human rights are not a priori 
to the political community; instead, they are discovered within 
the political community. As suggested above, human rights must 
be "made". Second, human rights do not defend the individual, 
but the whole of civilization. They help resolve the 
individual's alienation from the world by safe-guarding the 
world. Third, assuring human rights is not Arendt's goal -- in 
her estimation, human rights are not the highest moral good. 
Rather, resolving world alienation is her goal and human rights 
help achieve it. Finally, human rights do not reflect the 
nature of what a single human being should look like in the 
political community, but rather they reflect the nature of the 
human condition of plurality: how the lone individual is not 
really human and how he or she must adjust and shed his or her 
biology in order to become part of a community. 
While Arendt sees no "quick fix" to the world's problems, 
she does see potential for solving them. She argues that during 
the nineteenth century the sovereignty of the nation-state was 
limited. Those limitations prevented the nation-states from 
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performing certain crimes. For example, while forced migration 
was not new to the twentieth century, during the nineteenth 
century, nation-states were limited in how extensive a forced 
migration could be. The rules of inter-state treaties and the 
inter-dependence of the European nation-states presented 
utilitarian reasons for not committing these types of crimes 
against each other. Thus, while each nation-state thought of 
itself as sovereign, it really wasn't. Each nation-state 
recognized the limits of their own power. 
Arendt argues that nation-states have lost the limits to 
their sovereignty that they once had and she looks for ways in 
which such limitations can be reinstituted. She suggests two 
models: an international one and an intranational one. Both 
incorporate the ideals of federalism. Federalism is the only 
political structure that Arendt believes is capable of limiting 
sovereignty to such a degree that no component of the human race 
could be excluded from the human world; thus, it is the only 
structure which can guarantee that human rights will be 
observed. 
It is clear that Arendt believes that federalism should be 
instituted within the nation-state -- it would have the effect 
of transforming it into a true state. However, she is vague 
about what type of federal structure should be developed above 
states. More than just requiring a between-state mechanism, 
which is what Europe had during the nineteenth century, Arendt 
argues that an above-state mechanism is necessary to limit 
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national sovereignty. A world government, though, has too many 
trappings of the nation-state structure for Arendt to be 
satisfied with it. Thus, Arendt leaves many questions 
unanswered when it comes to an international solution to the 
problems of unlimited national sovereignty. Although she argued 
that federated structures would be sufficient to limit 
sovereignty for those nations that adopted such internal 
structures, she sensed that an international effort would be 
required to avoid the emergence of crimes against humanity which 
could still be performed by nations that still had the potential 
to do so -- i.e., those that were not federations. Yet she was 
at a loss to construct such an international system except to 
say that it must have the power to act above, not just between, 
nations. 
In some respects, then, Arendt's thoughts on human rights 
is clear. In other respects, she is quite vague. What can't be 
denied is that Arendt included human rights in the necessary 
solutions to the problems that plagued the twentieth century. 
However, many questions remain unanswered. 
An Arendtian Theory of Human Rights? 
As this thesis has discovered, Hannah Arendt had many ideas 
about human rights and their role in resolving the world 
alienation that characterizes contemporary society. But can it 
be said that she developed a theory of human rights or are we 
putting together pieces of her various theories that she herself 
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would not have linked? In other words, if Arendt's thoughts on 
human rights are truly tangential from the body of her 
theoretical work, they might be thought of as anecdotal and, 
therefore, would not be required reading for students of human 
rights. 
Ignoring the influence that Arendt's thought on human 
rights have already had in the real world, 2 if a theory of human 
rights is a systematic and comprehensive response to a political 
crisis which explicitly centers on human rights violations, 
Arendt could not be said to have developed one. Certainly 
because of the negative nature of her discussion of human 
rights, it seems unlikely that she could ever be considered a 
"human rights theorist." However, sharp attention paid to what 
she doesn't say in reference to a positive notion of human 
rights suggests that another point of view may be valid. 
Arendt is vehement about her criticisms of traditional 
human rights theories: she suggests that they have no political 
meaning at all. However, in Eichmann in Jerusalem, she defends 
the notion of crimes against humanity; and such crimes directly 
presuppose some sort of right of humanity. Yet the reader is 
left to draw his or her own inferences concerning her promotion 
of human rights. In other works, she uses such phrases as "if 
human rights exist, they would look like II Again, she is 
uncharacteristically non-committal about her opinion on this 
2. Stephen J. Whitfield, Into the Dark: Hannah Arendt and 
Totalitarianism (Philedelphia: Temple University Press, 1980), 
110-112. 
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subject. Finally, Arendt was uncomfortable about where her 1949 
article concerning human rights fit in to the rest of her work, 
revising it, expanding it, and more telling, not knowing where 
to place it in The Origins of Totalitarianism. 3 
Perhaps the fact that Arendt spends so little time building 
a new human rights theory indicates that she felt a need to 
distance herself from the traditional language of rights 
altogether. Indeed, referring to human rights as "human rights" 
might have prevented her from developing fully her own thoughts 
on rights. 
We are accustomed to thinking of human rights as Arendt 
seems to lead us to do when she criticizes traditional notions 
of them -- connecting them to our ideas about liberalism and 
individualism. Thus, some might argue that the real question 
may not be whether Arendt can be called a human rights theorist 
but whether she can be called a liberal theorist. This is an 
interesting train of thought because it leads us straight to the 
difficulty that may have led Arendt to her choice not to write 
an explicit and comprehensive theory of human rights. Can we 
talk about rights and at the same time divorce them from their 
tie to individualism? If we cannot disengage more general ideas 
of rights from eighteenth century individualism, neither can we 
disengage human rights from the more general notions of rights 
-- even if we wish to update them with the experiences of the 
twentieth century. In other words, we can reform traditional 
3. Young-Bruehl, 257, 285. 
notions of human rights, but we cannot uproot them or change 
their very nature. 
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Arendt wants to refocus our approach to rights altogether. 
Like Burke, she wants to guide us away from universal, 
individualistic rights. Speaking in the language of traditional 
rights theorists would distract from this effort. Relative to 
traditional rights theorists, Arendt discounts the individual 
altogether. She emphasizes, instead, the world -- what 
individuals and peoples have created that both "separates and 
joins them." Individualism ignores the world, treating the 
individual as the only relevant political entity. Arendt 
stresses the "thingness" of the world in order to convince her 
reader that the world really exists and is valuable. In fact, 
the world is the foundation for politics. Individuals create 
something other than themselves when they come together in a 
community. This thing that they create is independent from the 
individual in the same way that other people are independent 
from the individual. Arendt wants to heighten our awareness of 
this "other" and she does so by way of the language she uses. 
Where traditional rights theorists are accustomed to discussing 
autonomy, individual conscience and moral freedom, Arendt 
ignores these terms. Instead, she is only concerned with the 
individual once he or she is in a group. 
Arendt's emphasis on context -- the world that joins and 
separates individuals -- is impossible to articulate in the 
language of traditional rights theories. Traditional rights 
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theories use rights to protect the individual from the 
possiblity of tyrannical political power. Hence, they protect 
the individual from his or her own political context. In doing 
so, they alienate individuals from each other and from the world 
in which they live. Traditional rights theories can not 
possibly retain the category of obligation, transforming it 
instead into "hazardous charity", because they have done away 
with the foundation for obligation -- the priority of community. 
Arendt revives the idea of obligation by recognizing that the 
individual (really, the human race itself) can never be safe 
without a secure political community. Hence, it is the 
political community that Arendt wants to protect because, one 
might say, only through it can the individual be protected. The 
first step in this protection is getting her reader to value the 
world as a priority and to see it for what it is -- the 
foundation of political community. 
The language of traditional rights theories can not contain 
Arendt's thoughts on political community. For this reason, she 
could not use it. Instead, she invented her own language. In 
the same way that human rights underpin the terms individual 
conscience, moral freedom and autonomy for traditional human 
rights theorists, beneath all of Arendt's discussions on 
rootlessness, world alienation and superfluousness runs her own 
current of human rights. The backdrop of much of Arendt's 
thinking is a mostly silent, though sometimes expressed, 
commitment to her own version of human rights. It is a backdrop 
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that, when revealed momentarily, creates discord for the reader. 
One might be compelled to ask, "Can rights be both a priori and 
derived from the community?" 
Indeed, this thesis began with this question. The very 
obscurity of Arendt's thinking on rights led to it. However, 
the source of the obscurity was not Arendt's thoughts themselves 
but the traditional linkage between human rights and 
individualism. Once that link is severed, the radical nature of 
Arendt's views on human rights becomes apparent. Therefore, the 
view that Arendt's thoughts on human rights are tangential to 
her political thought is promoted by the blindness to the 
possibility that human rights can be grounded in something other 
than the individual. Thus, Arendt must be included in the human 
rights literature. Not doing so dismisses the original nature 
of her thought. 
The Efficacy of Arendt's Theory 
If one is to take Arendt's thoughts on human rights 
seriously, one is compelled to ask whether Arendt does a better 
job than the traditional human rights theorists in bringing this 
"step-child" human rights home to its proper place in political 
thought. As with Arendt's criticism of traditional theories of 
human rights, this question must be answered on both 
philosophical and practical planes. 
First, does Arendt do a better job at defending the idea of 
human rights in philosophical terms? For most human rights 
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theorists, human rights are the focal point of their theories of 
individualism, being frequently considered the contemporary 
equivalent of the Rights of Man. 4 Arendt, however, does not 
make them the focal point of her theory. To do so would lead 
her to the very same difficulties faced by traditional 
theorists: i.e., if human rights are owned by and protect only 
the individual, the community is not compelled to observe them. 
In more concrete terms, a community need not be seen as 
contradicting itself when it decides to observe one person's 
human rights and not another person's. One of those persons can 
be defined as not human or not human enough to be protected by 
such rights. This contradiction, says Arendt, is justified by 
the very structure of the nation-state. 
The contradiction, though, can only be justified in an 
environment which does not regard the world, the law or the 
mechanisms of the state as being separate from the nation. 
Thus, Arendt emphasizes that not the individual but the 
community must be the locus of politics. She does not speak of 
expressing one's interests against the community but of being a 
member and being a distinct component of the community --
distinct in that the individual retains his or her unique 
identity and a component in that he or she cannot ever be 
considered as a completely separate political entity from the 
4. J. Roland Pennock, "Rights, Natural Rights, and Human 
Rights -- A General View," chap. in Human Rights: NOMOS XXIII, 
eds. J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman (New York: New York 
University Press, 1967), 3ff. 
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community. 
By such an emphasis, Arendt moves the concept of human 
rights to a new location in political thought. Whereas in· 
individualism, human rights are the focal point of liberalism 
and ought to be pursued as ends in themsleves, in Arendt's 
thought, human rights are a tool that helps assure the rebirth 
of politics. Human rights are no longer the end of politics but 
are instead only the means through which politics can be 
approached. In this way, Arendt underlines that the end of 
politics is not the individual's satisfaction but the extension 
of the individual to matters that go beyond his or her immediate 
concerns. Only through such an extension can the individual 
hope to touch worldly everlastingness. Any theory that makes 
the individual its end, on the other hand, is inherently anti-
political because it is anti-world. It encourages the growth of 
world alienation. 
The effect of this relocation of human rights within the 
political framework is that human rights are removed from the 
realm of charity and placed into the realm of obligation. 
Indeed, with the survival of the political community itself at 
stake, human rights become politically compelling -- independent 
of the issues raised by the "individual" case at hand. It can 
be presumed that, where world alienation has dissipated, the 
priority of the survival of the world would take precedence over 
all interests that required the exclusion of any people or 
individual from the community. Thus, by giving their 
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application political urgency, Arendt provides a better defense 
for human rights than is provided by traditional theorists. 
Arendt offers a way to connect the universal value of human 
rights with the contingent political reality. 
However, it remains to be examined whether Arendt's thought 
on human rights can improve the practical situation of those 
whose rights are denied. As stated above, where world 
alienation does not exist, the tendency to exclude individuals 
and peoples should be counteracted by human rights. Can this 
new understanding of human rights, though, assist the 
realization of the end of world alienation as Arendt seems to 
want it to do? A full response to this question is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. 
Briefly, though, any response would have to center on the 
universality of Arendt's human rights claims and their 
unprecedented character (i.e., that they involve only the right 
to belong and no other individual rights). At first glance, it 
seems unlikely that Arendt's claims for universal rights could 
improve the plight of those whose rights are denied any more 
than traditional notions of human rights. If human rights are 
not politically rooted, as they are not by definition, then it 
is not possible for a universal claim to possess any political 
force that could strengthen the case against human rights 
violators. Persons and peoples with political power need only 
argue the inapplicability of such universal claims to their 
political realities. 
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On the other hand, based on the presumption that all 
societies are implicitly pluralistic (because of the necessary 
diversity of the individuals and peoples who inhabit each of 
them), one could argue that, while Arendt's notion of human 
rights does not bring immediate salvation, it enlarges the 
circle of persons who must support human rights. Added to the 
contingent of human rights defenders would be those 
constituencies concerned with preserving or creating the 
political community. These groups would be forced to recognize, 
first, the ties between being human and belonging to a community 
and, second, the necessity for the community to be an inclusive 
rather than an exclusive entity. Thus, the focus turns from 
protecting the individual who exists in a vacuum to protecting 
the inidividual's political context. 
One demonstration of the increase in constituency can be 
seen in Stephen Whitfield's description of the application of 
Arendt's notion of human rights by Justice Warren in several 
expatriation cases. The Chief Justice wrote: 
Citizenship is man's basic right ... It is nothing less 
than the right to have rights ... Remove this priceless 
possession and there remains a stateless person, disgraced 
and degraded in the eyes of his countrymen. He has no 
lawful claim to protection from any nation, and no nation 
may assert rights on his behalf. 5 
While the Justice does not claim that the community is protected 
by Arendt's notion of human rights, he recognizes the link 
between being human and belonging to a political community. The 
5. As quoted by Whitfield, 111. 
destructiveness of depriving a person of his or her political 
context became the basis for many of his subsequent opinions. 
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The application of Arendt's notion of human rights seems to 
make it impossible for a person to believe in both democracy and 
nationalism at the same time. Arendt's ideas concerning human 
rights make these two ideals contradictory. The pluralism 
demanded by Arendt's human rights requires the inclusion of all 
persons into the political community. Thus, Arendt breaks the 
link between the nation and sovereignty; she prevents the 
transformation of human rights into citizens' rights. In this 
more narrow way, Arendt's notion of human rights might have been 
more helpful to the stateless peoples and persons than were the 
traditional notions of human rights. Stateless persons, instead 
of reviving their culture or begging for inclusion, would have 
had the option to fight for reforms of the nation-state system 
itself. 
In sum, Arendt moves the concept of human rights from being 
an end in itself and the focal point of individualism to being a 
tool that helps assure the rebirth of politics. This adjustment 
satisfies her because, under her scheme, the goal of politics 
could not be subject to the private needs of the individual. At 
the same time, her theory requires the prevention and 
destruction of totalitarianism -- the phenomenon that all rights 
theorists agree presents the most potent threat to human rights. 
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